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No Queer Child Left Behind
By ORLY RACHMILOVITZ*
SINCE MARRIAGE EQUALITY WAS WON in the Supreme Court’s
June 2015 decision of Obergefell v. Hodges,1 the lesbian, gay, bisexual,2
and trans3 (“LGBT”) movement has been in search for the next great
cause for LGBT rights. Arguably, marriage has been the movement’s
most important goal (or at least the most visible one). Often relying
upon a rhetoric of sameness and commonality to emphasize the legiti-
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1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Sexual orientation is defined as a person’s predisposition or inclination toward a
particular type of romantic or sexual partner, activity or behavior. BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY, 1407 (8th ed. 2004).
3. Gender identity refers to one’s psychological understanding and expression of
one’s gender as male, female, both, in between, or neither. The Sylvia Rivera Law Project
(SRLP), a NYC based non-profit organization that provides legal services to the trans-
gender community, defines gender identity as “how we see ourselves. Some of us see our-
selves as women, some as men, some as a combination of both, some as neither. Some of us
have complex identities that may even be fluid and change over time.” Jody Marksamer &
Dylan Vade, Trans 101, SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT (Feb. 17, 2016, 1:19 PM), http://srlp
.org/trans-101 [https://perma.cc/Z4PX-XT7A]. SRLP describes “transgender” (or
“trans”) as “people (very broadly conceived) . . . whose gender identity and/or expres-
sion . . . does not or is perceived to not match stereotypical gender norms associated with
our assigned gender at birth.” Id. This article will mostly use the terms “trans” or “gender
non-conforming” to refer to people who do not conform to “traditional” or “expected”
gender presentation. Those who are gender non-conforming may or may not identify as
part of the trans community or as part of any sexual minority group, such as the lesbian
and gay communities. Jody L. Herman, Gender Regulation in the Built Environment: Gen-
der-Segregated Public Facilities and the Movement for Change in Washington, DC, A Case
Study Approach, 4–5 (May 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan)
(on file with author).
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macy of same-sex relationships, the fight for marriage could be seen as
a fight for the legitimacy of sexual minority identity itself. In turn, the
Obergefell decision could then be viewed as a paradigm shift from sex-
ual minorities challenging a politics of immutability, which offered
rights and protections so long as sexual minorities could be seen as
“trapped” in their identities and thus blameless for their divergence
from heteronormativity, to sexual minorities advancing a politics of
legitimacy which finds the source of sexual minority rights in that
such identities were just as acceptable and valued as their heterosex-
ual, cisgender counterparts.
Within this new paradigm several leading advocates have sug-
gested the issues faced by LGBT youth in schools as one important
focus.4 As they point out and as this article demonstrates, LGBT stu-
dents are highly marginalized, struggling through discrimination, har-
assment, limits to free speech, exclusionary curricula and school
activities, unwanted outing, and other infringements on their rights
and threats to their wellbeing. LGBT students have been the subjects
of derogatory name-calling and mock rapes. Their belongings have
been urinated upon. They have been prohibited from bringing same-
sex dates to their school proms. They face barriers using school facili-
ties that respond to their gender identity or are prohibited from dress-
ing according to their identities.5 The process of identity development
in the psychological sense—a central task at this stage of emotional
and mental development—is compromised by assimilation demands
because these demands hinder the achievement of a coherent sense-
of-self,6 and thus undermine the legitimacy of a sexual minority iden-
tity that should be free from such attacks. Social science research has
shown that LGBT youth who face homophobia or transphobia
through discrimination or harassment in schools are at higher risk of
drug use, risky sexual behavior, suicidality, and other mental health
risks than straight youth.7 They are also more likely to slip in their
4. James Esseks, After Obergefell, What the LGBT Movement Still Needs to Achieve, AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION [hereinafter ACLU] (Feb. 16, 2016, 11:54 AM), https://www.aclu
.org/blog/speak-freely/after-obergefell-what-lgbt-movement-still-needs-achieve [https://
perma.cc/LNX6-U52R]; Lana Birbrair, Beyond Obergefell: Alumni Advocates for LGBT Rights
Reflect on the Challenges that Remain, HARVARD LAW BULLETIN, 32, 34 (2015) (Feb. 16, 2016,
11:59 AM), https://today.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/WEB-HLB-f15-
NCN.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z73V-CNDY]; see also Jon W. Davidson, What Happened Today
at the Supreme Court, LAMBDA LEGAL (Feb. 16, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://www.lambdalegal
.org/blog/20150626_victory-analysis [https://perma.cc/B9GM-M9QD].
5. See infra Part II.2 and the case law discussed therein.
6. See infra Part I. B.
7. See infra Part I.C.2.
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academic achievements and less likely to graduate high school or go
to college.8
This article explores how the law so far has addressed hetero-
normative victimization,9 and compares the protections available to
LGBT students through courts to those available to their adult coun-
terparts suffering such mistreatment in the workplace.10 It then maps
out courts’ policies of extending stronger protections to children, or-
ganizing them along five categories of protection: (1) courts have not
required that students demonstrate suffering a double bind when ap-
plying the sex stereotyping theory in their favor; (2) courts have more
readily restricted same-sex sexual harassment; (3) courts have been
more willing to interpret “sex” to include sexual orientation or gender
identity; (4) even before Lawrence v. Texas11 was decided, criminaliza-
tion of sodomy was not accepted as a justification for discrimination
or harassment of students; and (5) courts offer a hybrid model of free
speech protection by rolling back children’s rights so that their
speech not undermine the educational setting while removing impor-
tant obstacles common in first amendment cases. By extending
stronger protections to students, courts effectively recognize chil-
dren’s identity interests in the educational environment, their height-
ened vulnerability to assimilation demands, and their greater need for
legal protections from such demands. This categorization then drives
the explanation (that is perhaps a partial explanation, but one that
has been largely overlooked so far) that the policy of stronger protec-
tion for students fits onto children’s emotional development needs.
8. SURVEY 2013, infra note 102 at xviii.
9. I use “victimization” as an umbrella term for abuse, neglect, harassment, discrimi-
nation or other forms of mistreatment youth experience, whether at school or other
spaces.
10. As demonstrated below, in Part II.2, there have been efforts put into legislation,
whether through explicit protections from discrimination or harassment of LGBT stu-
dents, or general anti-bullying litigation. However, these statutes have not been passed in
every state, and indeed some states have either backtracked on previously protective stat-
utes, or have legislated altogether new statutes, that exclude LGBT students from any spe-
cific or specific statutory protection against school victimization. Moreover, in February
2016, South Dakota became the first state to prohibit trans students’ use of sex-segregated
school facilities, such as restrooms and locker rooms, that correspond to their gender iden-
tity, but rather require them to use the facilities corresponding with their sex as assigned at
birth. Aime´e Lutkin, South Dakota Just Become the First State to Pass an Anti-Transgender Student
Bathroom Bill, JEZEBEL (Feb. 17, 11:06 PM), http://jezebel.com/south-dakota-just-become-
the-first-state-to-pass-an-ant-1759556487?utm_campaign=socialflow_jezebel_facebook&utm
_source=jezebel_facebook&utm_medium=socialflow [https://perma.cc/HVE3-AJE5].
11. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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This Article also demonstrates how relying on litigation is a par-
tial strategy to fend off school-based victimization. It closes with some
proposals for how the LGBT movement may expand its efforts to take
on additional non-litigation strategies to achieve an end to LGBT stu-
dents’ victimization. The purpose of this comparison is not to suggest
that protections for adults should necessarily fall in line with those of
children, or vice versa. Instead it is intended to ventilate the potential
reasons behind the different legal protections so that strategic use
could be made of them in the future. When we understand the moti-
vation for different legal protections, we can identify when adverse
legal protections are reasonable and when they are not, allowing us to
be more persuasive and deliberate about how we work to advance
such protections where they lack.
The LGBT movement continually devotes energy and resources
to sexual minority students’ issues because education plays a highly
significant role in shaping children’s identities.12 Education also plays
an instrumental role in preparing young people for life as contribut-
ing adult members of society. It instills in us the norms that come with
citizenship, and it has an impact on the way we see ourselves and
others. As such, the school environment is a primary source of assimi-
lation demands13—pressures to assimilate into the mainstream that
are coerced by others and motivated by animus14 toward a particular
group or identity category—on many aspects of identity, including cit-
izenship and religion.15 Sexuality is no exception. As children and
12. Psychology defines identity as a sense of who we are, what we value, and where we
are headed. See CHARLOTTE J. PATTERSON, CHILD DEVELOPMENT 543 (2008). Our identity is
related to those biological traits or social background that “involve[ ] learning about, relat-
ing to, and committing to, socially constructed meanings associated with [those] biological
[or social] status[es].” Holning Lau, Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 317, 331 (2007). See Orly Rachmilovitz, Family Assimilation Demands and
Sexual Minority Youth, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1374, 1377 (2014) (hereinafter: “Rachmilovitz, As-
similation Demands”).
13. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 26–27
(2006).
14. Yoshino explains that assimilation demands are those socialization efforts that are
not motivated by a legitimate reason, and highlights animus as one such illegitimate rea-
son. Id. at 26–27. However, as it seems Yoshino’s concern about assimilation demands actu-
ally hinges on the negative motivation at their root, in my previous writing I have also
considered it a central, indeed necessary, component in identifying harmful assimilation
demands which merit legal protection of identity rights. I do so in this Article as well. In
this sense, it is possible that school efforts at socialization, which are not based in animus
but would have a legitimate reason, would not be considered objectionable assimilation
demands.
15. Schools’ role in effecting children’s national or religious identity has been at the
root of the school prayer cases: Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lee v. Weisman, 505
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youth begin exploring and practicing their sexuality earlier than ever
before, sexuality is no longer invisible in schools.16 With an emphasis
on instilling gender roles or preventing teen-pregnancy, sexually
transmitted infections, and teen dating violence, schools tend to strug-
gle with students’ diverse sexual identities and conduct. Society’s in-
vestment in ensuring young people’s heteronormative sexuality makes
schools the primary site for policing their sexuality. As a result, stu-
dents face pressures to conform to heteronormative standards from a
variety of sources: faculty and staff, other students, and parents.
Conflicts around how sexuality is addressed at school take two
forms. First, a dispute can occur between the child and the school as a
state actor. Here, students usually contest assimilation demands by
faculty or staff (for instance, when a student is not permitted to take a
date of the same-sex to the prom), or students will bring claims
against the school for failing to protect them from assimilation de-
mands imposed by fellow students (for example, when a student is
called derogatory names referring to her sexual orientation or is phys-
ically assaulted). Courts balance the child’s rights against those of
other students or the obligations of school faculty and staff. Courts
apply doctrines similar to those governing employment law, but use
them to protect children more forcefully than they do their adult
counterparts.17
This policy of heightened protections for children’s identity de-
velopment free from assimilation demands also extends to the second
context of school based-disputes: conflicts between schools and par-
ents. In this line of cases, parents themselves—generally motivated by
concerns for their children’s heteronormative development18—con-
test school curriculum or activities, arguing that they violate parental
rights to the inculcation of their children. Although it is the child’s
identity that is compromised by schools’ assimilation demands, par-
ents are bringing claims against the schools following the premise that
as parents they are the rights holders in directing children’s identities.
Resolving these suits, courts will generally examine parental rights in
light of the state interest in a public, pluralistic education for future
U.S. 577 (1992); cases addressing school children’s recitation of “The Pledge of Alle-
giance”: e.g. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); as well as some
parental rights cases: Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
16. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 900
(2004).
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.B.
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citizens as a way to resolve the tension between what is essentially a
dispute over who—parents or the state—holds the right to demand
assimilation from children and thus construct their identity.19  Parents
are usually unsuccessful in these cases, as courts find most school pro-
grams merely expose children to different perspectives and ideas in a
non-coercive manner.20
While touching on the latter set of cases for context, this article
focuses on the former—where students are explicit parties (rather
than having their interests purportedly represented by others, be it
their parents or the state). Specifically, this article focuses on the com-
parison between the discrimination and harassment cases brought by
students and those brought by adult employees.
Part I presents an overview of the theories on identity develop-
ment and assimilation demands to show how such demands are harm-
ful to children broadly and to LGBT youth, specifically.
Part II analyzes the case law on adults’ claims against assimilation
demands in the workplace and students’ claims against assimilation
demands in schools to show the gains made so far: how courts extend
greater protections to schoolchildren than to adult employees.21
Part III hypothesizes why courts may be more willing to protect
LGBT students from assimilation demands. It theorizes that protec-
tion extended to children is rooted both in their psychological devel-
opmental processes advancing from dependence on adults to agency
and autonomy,22 as well as in children’s right to an open future.23
This right is closely tied to a public interest in education as a space
where children are inducted into democracy and their roles as func-
tioning, informed adults.
Lastly, I end with looking into the future. Through problematiz-
ing the focus on litigation, successful as it may be, I aim to suggest that
going forward, the LGBT rights movement ride the momentum of the
recent victory regarding marriage equality to achieve a more compre-
19. Orly Rachel Rachmilovitz, Masters of Their Own Destiny: Children’s Identities,
Parents’ Assimilation Demands and State Intervention 24–25 (May 2012) (unpublished
S.J.D. dissertation, University of Virginia School of Law) (on file with author) (hereinafter:
“Rachmilovitz, Masters”), Chapter Three Part II. Also see generally Douglas NeJaime, Inclu-
sion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for Differences Based on Religion and Sexual
Orientation, 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 303 (2009).
20. Rachmilovitz, Masters, supra note 19.
21. It should be noted at the outset that this comparison focuses on Title IX public
education cases (infra note 173) and Title VII government employment cases (infra note
115). As such, in a sense, it is a comparison of apples and apples.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
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hensive end to school-based assimilation demands. In addition to
making brief suggestions for strategies focused on K-12 education to
complement the litigation efforts, I briefly consider how the en-
hanced protection for LGBT students may inform protection from as-
similation demands in another, related context—specifically for
LGBT students in higher education.
I. From Melting Pot to Melt Downs
One may be born with physical traits, such as a racial phenotype
or female genitalia, or a social background, such as religious heritage
or national origin, associated with identity. Yet identity in its psycho-
logical meaning refers to the process of developing a sense of who we
are, what we value and where we are headed.24 Our identity is related
to those biological traits or social background that “involve learning
about, relating to, and committing to socially constructed meaning
associated with those biological [or social] status[es].”25 One’s identity
is well-developed (termed by developmental psychologists “identity
achievement”)26 once a coherent sense-of-self has emerged—that is, a
person’s behavior is not random but informed by specific, well
thought-out principles and values—that her sense-of-self is stable over
time, and that she presents and behaves outwardly in ways that are
consistent with her identity and sense-of-self.27 Social scientists have
studied the identity formation process extensively. Here, I outline
some general, well-accepted principles of identity formation, followed
by an overview of the theory of assimilation demands. I then connect
the two in showing how assimilation demands burden children and
youth in their identity development and emotional adjustment.
A. Before the Schoolhouse: Identity Development
The foundation to psychology’s investigation into identity is the
work of Erik Erikson. Though the field has progressed since Erikson’s
writing, a look into identity research would be incomplete without at-
tention to his contribution. To Erikson, identity, as any other aspect of
development,28 is a result of crisis that the child must solve in order to
progress to more advanced developmental tasks.29 Identity is what
24. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 543.
25. Lau, supra note 12.
26. Rachmilovitz, Masters, supra note 19, Chapter Two, Part I.A.
27. Id. at 330.
28. Rachmilovitz, Masters, supra note 19.
29. ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS 92 (1968).
210 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
emerges from the conflicts we face throughout development. Each cri-
sis resolution brings a new crisis, challenging our identity to grow in
“unity, . . . good judgment, and . . . the capacity ‘to do well’ . . . .”30
Though identity development is most central in adolescence, it
builds on foundations laid earlier in life. In early childhood, with in-
creasing motor and language skills, the child’s ability to explore and
question grows.31 She can study and prepare for the social roles her
identity will come to encompass. The adults around the child become
role models.32 By following their example, the child learns the tasks
tied to her future role and gains a sense of initiative and worth
through their practice alongside mentoring adults.33
With time, children are exposed to various social roles. The sense
of worth the child previously achieved from adapting to roles she saw
at home is now challenged by a sense of inferiority when these social
roles are not similarly valued in the greater community outside the
home.34 Children become aware of how social groups, such as race or
economic background, influence identity and of the value society may
place on identities and roles of those associated with those groups.35
Exploring different talents and skills facilitates industry in place of in-
feriority. The child regains her sense of worth as well as adds another
layer to her identity. Beyond her belonging to a social group, her
identity is now also a result of her own interests and capabilities.
During adolescence, identity development is at the forefront of
children’s emotional growth. Teens consider the impacts of political
ideologies and values on their identities. They utilize different sources
of information and create various influential social ties to integrate
ideal principles and values into a coherent philosophy according to
which they choose to live their lives.36 Though, for the most part, this
political identity is consistent with those of peers and teachers, adoles-
30. Id.
31. Id. at 115. Erikson is primarily concerned with children’s emerging sense of sexual
differences and sexual roles that they adopt from their parents.
32. Id. at 120.
33. Id. at 121–22. At this early age, Erikson explains the child’s identity as “I am what I
imagine I will be.”
34. See id. at 124.
35. Though attaching value to certain identity groups over others has become highly
questionable, Erikson’s link between different groups and social value can be helpful as we
move on to examine how assimilation demands on children may cause internalized trans/
homophobia, thus creating the sense of inferiority Erikson warns about in his writing. Id.
36. Norman T. Feather, Values in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL-
OGY 247, 254 (Joseph Adelson ed., 1980).
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cents’ identity formation is furthered by challenges to it.37 A young
person, who is prepared to protect her identity from others who
threaten to change, disapprove of, or silence it, will emerge with a
more resilient and stable identity. Stability and coherence will serve to
maintain that identity further as the world around the teen changes.
Identity stability and coherence also promotes self-regulation and a
sense of direction necessary to meet future challenges.38
Going through identity development, teens experiment with dif-
ferent roles and identities, and may adopt identities as a form of rebel-
lion against parents or others in their social environment. After taking
the time to sort between alternative identities, a person’s commitment
to identity, traits and roles is more enduring.39 All the different as-
pects of development—physical changes, cognitive skills, and social
engagement—contribute to the process of morphing childhood roles
into a more mature adult identity.40 Without evaluation of different
aspects and alternatives, a commitment to certain identities or identity
traits, or lack of commitment altogether, could result in failure to sus-
tain relationships or occupations.41 Identity confusion then involves
doubts regarding early forms of identity that may continue to hinder
identity formation.42
Once the period of exploration is over, and the adolescent’s task
of identity formation is complete, a person is able to commit to values
and life tasks.43 She is also now able to accomplish what Erikson
viewed as true intimacy: the merging of identities.44 Where a coherent
and stable identity has been achieved, adults enjoy higher levels of
mental health than adults who have committed to identity without ex-
ploration or who have yet to achieve identity commitment.45
37. ERIKSON, IDENTITY, supra note 29, at 130.
38. Feather, supra note 36, at 317.
39. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 544.
40. James E. Marcia, Identity in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY
159, 161 (Joseph Adelson ed., 1980).
41. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 544.
42. ERIKSON, IDENTITY, supra note 29, at 131–132. Erikson eloquently explains the
harm of identity confusion: “Youth after youth, bewildered by the incapacity to assume a
role forced on him by the inexorable standardization of American adolescence, runs away
in one form or another, dropping out of school, leaving jobs, staying out all night, or
withdrawing into bizarre and inaccessible moods.”
43. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 544.
44. ERIKSON, IDENTITY, supra note 29, at 135. Intimacy, according to Erikson, need not
be only sexual. Instead, he focuses on “a true and mutual psychological intimacy with an-
other person.” Id.
45. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 544.
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Erikson dedicated portions of his work to the development of sex-
uality in children through adulthood. His account of this develop-
ment is highly heteronormative and reflects a binary under which sex
aligns with gender and sexual orientation.46 Writing in the 1960s,
Erikson did not even consider the possibility of sex or gender fluidity
or the transitioning between sexes to better accommodate gender
identity.47 He was bewildered by the ability of people with same-sex
sexual orientation to function well,48 and believed that female sexual-
ity is defined by non-maleness,49 rather than being independent and
equally valuable. Although Erikson’s work provides a platform for un-
derstanding identity formation, his work on sexuality development is
of lesser help when examining the development of non-heterosexual
orientation or gender nonconforming identities.
Some psychologists suggest that in order to reach full identity
achievement one must also come to self-acceptance and pride regard-
ing sexual orientation and that mere commitment is insufficient to
46. See ERIKSON, IDENTITY, supra note 29, at 285. Biological sex, according to Erikson,
dictates gender identity development that is socially understood as attached to that anat-
omy; that is that females develop feminine gender identities. As Erikson puts it:
Am I saying then, that “anatomy is destiny”? Yes, it is destiny, insofar as it deter-
mines not only the range and configuration of physiological functioning and its
limitation but also, to an extent, personality configurations. The basic modalities
of woman’s commitment and involvement naturally also reflect the ground plan
of her body.
Id.
47. Id. at 285–86. Erikson considers variations to be possible only within gender/sex
but not between genders/sexes. Women may move from heightened femininity to de-
creased femininity and even a degree of masculinity. Men, too, may contribute to “mother-
liness” as much as society permits. However, this is not a shift in gender identity — men
taking up care duties maintain the understanding of their male/masculine gender identity
rather than adopt a female/feminine gender identity. Id.
48. Id. at 53. After grouping “latent homosexuality” and “psychopathic tendencies,”
Erikson comments that,
it is true that individuals suspected of overt homosexuality have on occasion been
treated with utmost derision and cruelty . . . if we ask why men choose such a life,
why they stick to it. . . and above all why they function in good health, in high
spirits, and with occasional heroism, we do not have a satisfactory dynamic
answer.
Id.
49. Id. at 116–17 (describing differences between girls’ and boys’ development in
early childhood, rooting such differences in penis envy and the oedipal complex. “While
the boy has this visible, erectable, and comprehensible organ to which he can attach
dreams of adult bigness, the girl’s clitoris only poorly sustains dreams of sexual
equality . . . .”).
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establish an identity well prepared for intimacy.50 This process of
adopting a sexual minority identity and coming out as such to others
is an ongoing process that occurs and evolves throughout life.51
While the question of gender identity and sexual orientation’s
causes may bear significance in certain legal matters that turn on
whether these identities are immutable,52 the normative question that
occupies this article is whether, once these identities begin to emerge
in children, the attempt to prevent their development or to manipu-
late and alter them is within the contours of schools’ authorities (as a
state actor) or other students’ rights, particularly given the potential
harm to children whose sexuality is contested by others.53 The follow-
ing parts provide a brief overview of assimilation demands on identity
and their harms to children.
B. Assimilation Demands: The Basics
The ideal of assimilation—conforming to the mainstream—is
embodied in the metaphor of American society as a melting pot. Ac-
cording to this metaphor, minorities are encouraged to assimilate into
a neutral, American identity, which incorporates traits from different
identity groups.54 Law Professor Kenji Yoshino criticizes assimilation
as costly to one’s authentic self—denying one’s freedom to develop an
identity independent of pressures to conform.55 Yoshino distinguishes
between assimilation that is necessary for citizenship, socialization,
50. Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus & Kris A. Langabeer, Developmental Trajectories of Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Youths, in LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL IDENTITIES AND YOUTH 97, 99,
101 (Anthony R. D’Augelli & Charlotte J. Patterson eds., 2001).
51. Id. at 102.
52. It should be noted here that the traditional approach to immutability—that an
identity or trait are fixed and cannot be changed, thus garnering constitutional protec-
tion—has evolved to encompass identities and traits whose conversion is so highly burden-
some that it would abhorrent for the state to demand its change. See generally Watkins v. U.S
Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 1495 (2009). Generally speaking, and without going into nuance that is outside the
scope of this paper, race and gender are possible examples of the “old” immutability,
whereas religion or appearance can be considered possible examples of “new”
immutability.
53. Of course, attempts to change or police normative gender identities are similarly
motivated by heteronormative animus and can be oppressive as well. However because the
empirical and statistical data as presented below reveal that LGBT students are more nega-
tively affected by assimilation demands. Thus assimilation demands on normative identities
are out of the scope of this paper. Cf. Luke A. Boso, Symposium: Policing Masculinity in
Small-Town America, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); cf. Luke A. Boso,
Real Men, 37 HAWAII L. REV. 107, 108–09 (2015).
54. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 140–41, 179.
55. See generally, YOSHINO, supra note 13.
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and peaceful social order, such as speaking a language or obeying the
law, from assimilation that is coerced by others and may be motivated
by animus toward a particular group or identity category.56 These dis-
tinctions are not always clear and straightforward. Additionally, they
may shift along context, place, and time.
Yoshino articulates three types of coerced assimilation (or “assim-
ilation demands”): conversion, passing, and covering.57 Conversion is
the demand that one assimilate by changing an unfavorable identity
or identity trait into a more acceptable one.58 Passing is defined as the
demand to assimilate by concealing one’s unfavorable identity and
leading others to believe that the individual identifies with the main-
stream.59 Lastly, covering is the demand to assimilate by muting or
downplaying the unfavorable identity that one has made known to
others.60 While conversion and passing target one’s status as a mem-
ber of a minority group, covering, on the other hand, is a demand
that focuses on conduct that expresses a minority identity.61 Another
aspect of covering, reverse-covering, is the demand that the individual
perform according to stereotypes associated with her identity group.62
It equally compromises one’s authentic identity and conduct. Because
assimilation demands and their pressures conflict with an individual’s
sense-of-self and her expression of that self, and undermine the con-
sistency between the authentic self and the outwardly expressed self,
all assimilation demands are harmful to identity and to the authentic
self. Therefore assimilation demands create psychological burdens,
such as feelings of inferiority or self-hatred.63
Yoshino’s work illustrates the unique obstacles that minorities
face when confronting assimilation demands. He focuses extensively
56. Id. at 26–27. Yoshino gives examples of racial minorities required to “act white”
due to white supremacy; women instructed to downplay their family responsibilities at work
because of patriarchy and LGBT persons asked not to “flaunt” because of homophobia. Id.
at xi.
57. Yoshino is inspired by Erving Goffman’s work on stigma. Goffman describes how
different socially unfavorable groups navigate the performance of their “spoiled identities”
to escape social burdens such as stigmatization and discrimination. ERVING GOFFMAN,
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITIES 41–102 (1963).
58. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 46.
59. Id. at 17–18.
60. Id. at 18.
61. Id. at 22 (“[D]iscrimination directs itself not against the entire group, but against
the subset of the group that fails to assimilate to mainstream norms. This new form of
discrimination targets minority cultures rather than minority persons.”).
62. Id. at 23. Yoshino elaborates on reverse-covering with the example of women in
the workplace. Id. at 143–52.
63. Lau, supra note 12, at 324–25.
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on the divide assimilation demands create within one’s sense-of-self—
a dichotomy between the authentic self, true self, and a false self
whose purpose is to mediate between the true self and the world.64
When assimilation demands deny an authentic identity one cannot
achieve full emotional health by appreciating and expressing her
identity. Thus, identity development in the psychological sense, the
development of understanding who we are, what we value, and where
we are headed, is compromised by assimilation demands because
these demands undermine the achievement of a coherent sense-of-
self.65
C. Assimilation Demands’ Impact on Children
Assimilation demands on children are highly troubling as multi-
ple factors increase children’s vulnerability to such demands. Factors
such as children’s stage of identity and emotional development, their
attachment and dependence on adults, and the power structure
within their environments, leave children vulnerable to harmful assim-
ilation demands. Children are then more dependent on protection
from outside sources such as the legal system. To conclude that assimi-
lation’s harms should be mitigated by the law first requires examining
the premise that children are in fact harmed, and severely so, by as-
similation demands. The extreme level and quality of harm children
suffer warrants state intervention.
Though Yoshino couches his arguments about assimilation’s
harms to identity in the idea of the authentic self,66 Erikson’s work
adds to the understanding of assimilation’s harms to identity, and par-
ticularly children’s identity development. Erikson suggested that ex-
perimentation is pivotal for a healthy identity. If one is unable to
64. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 184–85 (presenting D.W. Winnicott’s theory regarding
true and false selves and the relationship among them as measures of psychological
health). Both Winnicott’s work and Yoshino’s use of it have been subject to criticism by
legal scholars. Paul Horwitz suggested that: “There is reason to be skeptical of Winnicott’s
simple schema of the true and false selves. [These vague terms are] not much help in
identifying precisely what, if anything, the True Self means.” Paul Horwitz, Uncovering Iden-
tity, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1289–90 (2007) (book review). Marc Poirier questions
Yoshino’s assertion that authenticity is a universal goal, and therefore assimilation is a uni-
versal harm. Marc R. Poirier, Microperformances of Identity: Visible Same-Sex Couples and the
Marriage Controversy, 15 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 3, 37–39 (2008). I mention Win-
nicott’s theory here because it is the psychological foundation for Yoshino’s argument. As
my own project continues, I make better use of Erikson’s analysis of harms to identity
because of identity foreclosure, confusion, and assimilation demands’ general challenge to
identity achievement and intimacy.
65. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 543.
66. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 184–85.
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develop her identity through exploration she is at risk of identity con-
fusion and foreclosure.67 Thus, achieving a coherent and stable iden-
tity is necessary for adults to enjoy higher levels of mental health than
adults who have committed to identity without exploration or who
have yet to achieve identity commitment. Erikson touches on what, in
effect, are assimilation demands on youth’s identities. While adoles-
cents struggle to forge a coherent identity that is natural and authen-
tic to them, outside pressures to assimilate into an expected, more
desirable identity may result in a range of harms to that teen. Put dif-
ferently, assimilation demands threaten identity achievement because
they discourage the exploration and experimentation necessary
before committing to an authentic identity and thus may lead to the
harms of identity confusion against which Erikson warns.68 Without
exploring the authentic self, identity foreclosure occurs, and with it
the inability to accomplish intimacy as well as overall weakened emo-
tional health.
Though, under Yoshino’s and Erikson’s theories, we are all
harmed by assimilation demands that foreclose our identity explora-
tion and compromise our healthy identity development, children are
exceptionally vulnerable to assimilation demands because of their in-
complete development.69 Where adults who have completed their
identity development are vulnerable to identity harms, certainly chil-
dren who are still forming their identity are increasingly vulnerable to
those harms. A legal framework that would aspire to end assimilation
demands must deflect the particular and exacerbated harm assimila-
tion demands create for children. Though Yoshino makes a compel-
ling case for protecting adults from assimilation demands that violate
their civil rights, the case for children’s protection might be more
challenging to make. That there are harms to children that are differ-
ent and worse than harms to adults may not be an argument persua-
sive enough to overcome the state’s strong interest in creating a
productive and informed citizenry through education and its author-
ity to do so. However, the state’s power to educate should not justify a
blanket rule against protection but rather require the development of
more refined legal tools that can identify where protection is needed
67. According to Erikson, identity confusion involves doubts regarding early forms of
identity that may continue to hinder identity formation. ERIKSON, supra note 29, at 131.
Identity foreclosure is the result of inability to explore identity options, roles or otherwise
develop a sense-of-self. This hinders reaching identity achievement and the intimacy and
overall emotional health. Id. at 135.
68. ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 131–132 (1964).
69. Lau, supra note 12, at 327.
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and the form said protection should take. I illustrate immediately be-
low the two primary reasons for legal intervention to protect children
from assimilation demands: ensuring children’s optimal development
and the distinctive harms to LGBT youth.
1. Children’s Optimal Development
The distinct and elevated harms children’s identities suffer when
subject to assimilation demands are a result of their developmental
stage.70 The law should take it upon itself to compensate for chil-
dren’s inability to deflect harmful assimilation demands since chil-
dren have yet to fully develop coping skills and lack the resources that
allow them to handle assimilation demands and their harms. More
importantly, this leaves children particularly prone to assimilation de-
mands that impose an identity that may not ring true.71 Yoshino is
primarily concerned with the individual’s opportunity to develop her
authentic self,72 not with how she actually would accomplish doing so.
Nowhere is the denial of exploration in identity development more
critical than to children in a developmental stage that centers around
this task. Yoshino’s concern about assimilation demands restricting
opportunities for exploration and experimentation with identity and
authenticity is perhaps most relevant to children.
Because their identity has not yet formed, adults consider chil-
dren waverers who must be protected from developing an unfavorable
identity and converted to comply with expectation of what their iden-
tity should be.73 Accordingly, schools may wish to indoctrinate or ex-
pose students only to values and goals the state sees appropriate. To
preserve heteronormative social standards (a public interest whose va-
lidity is at least questionable under the Supreme Court jurisprudence
70. Id. See also, Rotheram-Borus & Langabeer, supra note 50, at 105.
71. Lau, supra note 12, at 327.
72. Yoshino terms this “self-elaboration,” which is “the most important work we can
do.” YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 184.
73. Id. at 44. It is also important to consider how the content of assimilation demands
on may vary depending on context and may be colored by how they implicate multi-faceted
identities. Rachmilovitz, Masters, supra note 19, at 64. For example, the meaning of a “de-
sirable” identity that the child develops will be different in a conservative versus a liberal
community or family (see generally Boso, Real Men, supra note 53) or in transracial adoptions
where the child’s racial identity may be different than the parents (see Kim H. Pearson,
Displaced Mothers, Absent and Unnatural Fathers: LGBT Transracial Adoption, 19 MICH. J. GEN-
DER & L. 149 (2012); Kim H. Pearson, Legal Solutions for APA Transracial Adoptees, UC IRVINE
L. REV. 1179 (2013)). Further on the issue of context, assimilation demands may be im-
posed by minority groups on their own members as well, see Russell K. Robinson, Uncover-
ing Covering, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1809 (2007); Luke A. Boso, Acting Gay, Acting Straight:
Sexual Orientation Stereotyping (forthcoming).
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on LGBT cases in recent decades)74 schools may utilize variously ag-
gressive tactics in the context of sexuality such as discrimination or
restrictions on speech or failure to prevent or end harassment of
LGBT students by school staff or fellow students, all of which, sends
students a message that same-sex sexual orientation or gender non-
conformity are undesirable and punishable. Thus, schools often make
students vulnerable to assimilation demands in their most severe
forms (conversion and passing). And indeed LGBT students, as a
whole, tend to be better protected by the law in this context from
assimilation demands than adult employees, university students, or
children experiencing assimilation demands at home.
Conformity to assimilation demands causes children and youth to
abandon their sense-of-self and commit to goals and values they are
expected to adopt even when these are inconsistent with their iden-
tity.75 As teens struggle with developing their identity, assimilation de-
mands jeopardize a strong sense-of-self and psychological health,
resulting in a young person’s reduced productivity, depression, and
difficulty forming and sustaining intimate relationships.76 Other un-
fortunate consequences of victimization are high rates of suicidality,77
substance abuse,78 and homelessness due to either running away from
home or being cast out by parents.79 Faced with assimilation demands,
children realize they cannot depend on their close contacts for sup-
port in their identity explorations.80
74. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Obergefell, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015). See infra Part III.B.
75. Lau, supra note 12, at 332.
76. Id. at 329–30.
77. Rotheram-Borus & Langabeer, supra note 50, at 111–13. See also Caitlin Ryan et al.,
Family Rejection as a Predictor of Negative Health Outcomes in White and Latino Lesbian, Gay and
Bisexual Young Adults, 123 PEDIATRICS 346, 229 (2009), (Feb. 7, 2016, 10:56 AM) http://
pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/123/1/346.full?ijkey=NrncY0H897lAU&keytype=
ref&sitevid=aapjournals [https://perma.cc/GY74-L9YX] (presenting data regarding de-
pression, suicidality and the link between them). Additional studies show that youth at the
intersection of sexual orientation and race/ethnicity are at even greater risk for depression
and suicidality.
78. Rotheram-Borus & Langabeer, supra note 50, at 97–98.
79. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 491–92. See also Rotheram-Borus & Langabeer, supra
note 50, at 104 (reporting high rates of negative reactions from parents upon children’s
disclosure of same-sex sexual orientation, including high rates of children being expelled
from home pursuant coming out).
80. Rotheram-Borus & Langabeer, supra note 50, at 105, mainly referring to parents
and friends, but the same may apply to teachers, school staff or fellow students. See also
SURVEY 2013, and SURVEY 2009, infra note 102.
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2. Assimilation’s Harms on LGBT Youth
While Yoshino centers his theory primarily on sexual minorities
because he believes some assimilation demands apply to this group
more than others, I concentrate on sexual minority youth because
they are more vulnerable to assimilation demands than other groups
are. Indeed, the younger children who come out as LGBT are more
likely to experience victimization at school, as younger children and
teens tend to be less accepting of LGBT peers.81
Research in psychology has identified several specific negative
outcomes linked to victimization of LGBT students in schools, both in
the short term and later in life,82 such as depression, compromised
life satisfaction,83 and lower self-esteem.84 Other outcomes are harm-
ful behavior such as suicide attempts, illegal drug use, risky sexual be-
havior85 (including higher risk of HIV or sexually transmitted
infections and diagnoses),86 delinquency, and aggression.87 One study
found that severe victimization almost doubled the rates of these neg-
ative health outcomes, across the board, compared to mild or low vic-
timization.88 Another study found that adults who have experienced
victimization in school because they were gender nonconforming re-
gardless of sexual orientation are at higher risk of developing post-
traumatic stress disorder later in life than those who were not gender
nonconforming.89
81. Stephen T. Russell, Russell B. Toomey, Caitlin Ryan & Rafael M. Diaz, Being Out at
School: The Implications for School Victimization and Young Adult Adjustment, AM J. OF ORTHO-
PSYCHIATRY 84(6) 635, 636–37 (2014) [hereinafter Out at School]. The argument may, how-
ever, be made that coming out earlier can be beneficial, as younger children may have a
more fluid concept of difference, especially on gender identity and expression lines. I am
only aware of anecdotal, rather than research-based, evidence in support of this
proposition.
82. Id. at 636.
83. Russell B. Toomey, Caitlin Ryan, Rafael M. Diaz, Noel A. Card & Stephen T. Rus-
sell, Gender-Nonconforming Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth: School Victimization
and Young Adult Psychosocial Adjustment, 1(s) PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GEN-
DER DIVERSITY 71, 75 (2013).
84. Russell et al., Out at School, supra note 81, at 640.
85. Id. at 641.
86. Stephen T. Russell, Caitlin Ryan, Russell B. Toomey, Rafael M. Diaz, Jorge
Sanchez, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Adolescent School Victimization: Implications for
Young Adult Health and Adjustment, 81(5) J. OF SCHOOL HEALTH 223, 229 (2011) [hereinaf-
ter School Victimization].
87. Id. at 224, 228. Tying these outcomes to physical victimization, and finding them
in greater incidence in boys than in girls.
88. Id. Fig. 1, at 228.
89. Toomey et al., supra note 83, at 73.
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Unfortunately, many sexual minority children are not raised in
supportive environments (i.e. families and/or schools) that stand by
them regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity and
which can temper the effects of victimization. Coupled with family re-
jection, school-based mistreatment leads to a lack of educational op-
portunities, and thus lower income potential.90 Studies on the state of
LGBT youth in additional contexts, such as homelessness or the crimi-
nal juvenile system,91 reflect the pervasive and egregious conse-
quences that LGBT youth suffer because of assimilation demands.
Thus the negative outcomes of assimilation demands are com-
pounded with the impact of several sources of victimization, for in-
stance families, peers, and other life circumstances, such as
socioeconomic status, quality of relationships, and personality fac-
tors.92 On the bright side, being out at school (that is, being better
able to resist assimilation demands in some way) has been linked to
better emotional adjustment.93 These findings together illustrate the
urgency of systemic change to end the disempowerment and vulnera-
bility of LGBT youth.94
But what is it about sexual orientation or gender identity that
makes LGBT youth so vulnerable to harmful environments? Sexual
orientation and gender identity, as identity categories, are indepen-
dent of the sexual orientation or gender identity of family members.
As opposed to racial or religious minority youth whose community
may typically share their racial or religious identity and can therefore
provide guidance, support, and encouragement during the stages of
identity development, LGBT youth usually have no such inherent sup-
port system.95 LGBT youth are faced with exploring, forming, disclos-
90. Considering the harms to education rights and equity and the negative education
outcomes described throughout this piece, it is only a logical conclusion that such compro-
mised education would lead to lower earning potential.
91. For a study on the vulnerability of LGBT youth for over-involvement in and higher
penalties from the juvenile system, see Kathryn Himmelstein & Hannah Bruckner, Criminal
Justice and School Sanctions Against Nonheterosexual Adolescents: A National Longitudinal Study,
127 PEDIATRICS 49, 52 (2011), (Feb. 7, 2016, 11:05AM) http://pediatrics.aappublications
.org/ content/127/1/49.full.pdftˇml [https://perma.cc/LH3X-5Z8Q]; NICHOLAS RAY, NA-
TIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH: AN
EPIDEMIC OF HOMELESSNESS 21–22, 59, 71 (2006), (Feb. 7, 2016, 11:09AM) http://www
.thetaskforce.org/static_html/downloads/HomelessYouth.pdf [https://perma.cc/R47X-
PTJA].
92. Toomey et. al, supra note 83, at 78.
93. Russell et al., Out at School, supra note 81, at 635.
94. See also suggestions regarding institutional change, id. at 641.
95. STUART BIEGEL, THE RIGHT TO BE OUT: SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER IDENTITY
IN AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION 124 (2010) (“[A]n LGBT identity often emerges quietly
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ing, and performing their sexuality without assistance, and often with
hostility.
Heteronormative culture translates into LGBT youth often suffer-
ing the most extreme type of assimilation demands, which in turn,
renders them prone to the most severe harms as a result of such de-
mands. American society and its legal system tend to be uncomforta-
ble with the sexuality of children and youth, and particularly with the
prospect of young people developing non-heteronormative identities.
This “moral panic”96 guides courts deciding custody disputes involving
lesbian or gay parents,97 informs education policies such as “No
Promo Homo” laws,98 and ultimately motivates mistreatment of non-
heteronormative children, whether they identify as LGBT or not.
Although all children may be vulnerable to assimilation demands,
sexual minority children are at higher risk because they are left to
develop their sexual orientation or gender identity often without com-
munity support.99 Moreover, developing and asserting sexual minority
identities comes at a higher cost to emotional health due to social
heteronormativity—whether internalized or from outside sources—
and pursuant isolation.
Sexual minority youth may find themselves required to defend
their sexuality. To the extent that same-sex sexual orientation or gen-
der nonconforming identities are becoming more acceptable for
adults, these identities should be respected as valid for youth, as well.
Presumably, LGBT adults used to be LGBT youth.100 Assimilation de-
mands designed to prevent or mitigate non-heteronormative sexual
orientation and gender identity should be considered equally as unac-
and secretly within a young person. It may be the case that the young person has no one to
turn to—no friends to talk with about it, no family or community members to open up
to.”). But see Pearson, APA Transracial Adoptees, supra note 73, at 1189; Pearson, LGBT
Transracial Adoption, supra note 73.
96. See GILBERT HERDT, INTERSECTIONS: MORAL PANIC, SEX PANICS: FEAR AND THE FIGHT
OVER SEXUAL RIGHTS 5 (2009). Moral panic involves “[l]arge social events occurring in
troubled times when a serious threat by evil-doers incites societal reaction.” Id. at 5.
97. See Clifford J. Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: Homosexuality, Parenthood, and the Gender
of Homophobia, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 257, 285 (2009).
98. See William N. Eskridge Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse
and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) (discussing policies
and laws prohibiting positive discussion of homosexuality in school programs and curric-
ula, or any such discussion at all).
99. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 184.
100. This, of course, does not discount LGBT adults who have arrived at their sexual
identity later in life, or the fluidity in sexual orientation or gender expression some may
experience throughout life, for example of exceptions to this statement. This is why it is
qualifies with “presumably.”
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ceptable because they, too, reflect homophobia and are motivated by
it. Still, one could argue that although possessing these identities as
adults is value-neutral, it is important to prevent or mitigate them in
children because avoiding early queer identities might reduce the dis-
crimination or harassment children would grow to encounter as
adults. This argument is unpersuasive. If LGBT identities were truly
value-neutral, as they should be and are becoming under cases such as
Lawrence, Romer, and Obergefell, these potential rights infringements
(themselves assimilation demands) or other forms of mistreatment
adults experience would not be a concern—they would no longer ex-
ist as acceptable or tolerated behavior toward sexual minorities.
II. Behind the Schoolhouse Gate: Enhanced Protections for
Sexual Minority Students
Two main areas of jurisprudence govern problems of state-based
assimilation demands in educational settings.101 The first is discrimi-
nation and harassment law, where sexual minority youth suffer une-
qual or hostile treatment at school because their sexuality does not
conform to heteronormativity. The second relevant area of jurispru-
dence is free speech, where students dispute the limitations of
whether and how they are allowed to express their sexuality in the
educational setting.
Beyond the fact that mistreatment of LGBT students infringes
upon their legal rights, such mistreatment has the effect of compro-
mising children’s educational interests. Mistreatment at school im-
pacts LGBT students’ access to education and their ability to have a
meaningful and beneficial education. About a third of students partic-
ipating in a school climate survey102 reported missing at least one day
101. Other contexts, while state-based, reflect a conflict between parents’ rights and
state authority in forming children’s identities and directing their education. These con-
texts may include religious education, sexual education, or LGBT-related issues woven into
the general curriculum. Because this paper examines primarily state-based education as
conflicting with students’ rights, rather than parents’ rights, and because adults (whose
rights do not depend on a third party in the way children’s rights do on parents,) render-
ing the comparison between children and adults generally lacking in any meaningful util-
ity, aside from their discussion below, those contexts of school-based assimilation are
generally beyond the scope of this paper.
102. See Joseph G. Kosciw, et al., The 2013 National School Climate Survey: The Exper-
iences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in Our Nation’s Schools 13
(2013) [hereinafter SURVEY 2013] (The survey sample consisted of over 7,898 LGBT stu-
dents between the ages 13–21 from all 50 states and the District of Columbia.); cf. Joseph
G. Kosciw, et al., The 2009 National School Climate Survey: The Experiences of Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in Our Nation’s Schools 13 (2010) [hereinafter SUR-
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of school a month because they feel unsafe. Sixty-one percent of stu-
dents who have been severely or frequently victimized based on their
sexual orientation missed school, compared to 18.2% of students who
experienced lower victimization because of their sexual orientation.103
Similar rates are reported regarding gender expression: 58.6% of stu-
dents who experienced higher victimization on this basis missed
school, compared to only 17.3% of students experiencing lower vic-
timization.104 The mean grade point average for students who have
been frequently harassed because of their sexual orientation or gen-
der identity is over half a grade lower than that of students who were
harassed less often (2.8 for sexual orientation and 2.9 for gender iden-
tity versus 3.3).105 Also, LGBT students who experienced higher levels
of victimization were far less likely to pursue higher education than
LGBT students who experienced lower levels of victimization.106
The import of education is reflected in a system of legislative pro-
tections for education access and equity, both at the federal and state
levels. At the federal level, statutes such as No Child Left Behind,107
the Education Equal Access Act,108 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 1972109 are all designed to ensure children in the
United States receive an education that prepares them for adult life,
as well as offer some protection to LGBT students. The Education
Equal Access Act, for example, ensures that a school that permits stu-
dent groups to operate at school, must extend the same to LGBT stu-
dent groups such Gay-Straight Alliances. Title IX has been interpreted
to extend protection mainly to trans and gender non-conforming stu-
dents, guaranteeing them access to the bathrooms and locker rooms
consistent with their gender identity or ensuring that they may dress
according to their gender identity.
California is an apt example for protections on the state level, as a
state with strong protections for equity in education both generally
and for LGBT youth specifically. California prioritized education so
VEY 2009] (Just over a quarter reported missing at least one day of school a month because
they felt unsafe in the 2009 survey, consisting of over 7,200 LGBT students between the
ages 13–20 from all 50 states.).
103. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at xviii.
104. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at 49.
105. Id. at 47, at xvii (compared to 2.7 versus 3.1 SURVEY 2009, supra note 102).
106. Id., at xviii (8.7% of LGBT students who experienced higher levels of victimiza-
tion, compared to 4.2% of LGBT students who experienced lower levels of victimization).
See also id., n. 29 and accompanying text.
107. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
108. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2011).
109. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2011).
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much that it has enshrined the right to education in its Constitu-
tion.110 Establishing a Constitutional right to education, the CA Con-
stitution highlights the significance of: “[a] general diffusion of
knowledge and intelligence [as] being essential to the preservation of
the rights and liberties of the people.”111 California’s Constitution and
laws require the State to provide basic education opportunities to
every child. The public education system must be open and equal for
all students so that no student is denied the necessary conditions to
learn. California’s Student Safety and Violence Prevention Act guaran-
tees equal rights and opportunities in education to all students, re-
gardless of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender
identity.112 In the summer of 2011, California became the first state in
the nation to require school curriculum and textbooks to incorporate
instruction about the contribution of LGBT people in history and so-
cial science classes.113 Additionally, children in California are obli-
gated by law to attend school, as they may face sanctions for truancy
otherwise.114
Against this background of the alarming data and legislative re-
sponse, this Part more deeply examines the legal protections available
for LGBT employees and those available for LGBT students. It ana-
lyzes the seminal case law relevant to the two contexts in order to show
that indeed courts tend to better protect children than adults from
assimilation demands targeting sexual orientation or gender identity.
It then offers a taxonomy for the ways in which courts protect children
where they do not extend the same to adults.
The purpose of this comparison and the taxonomy that follows is
not to suggest that protections for adults should necessarily fall in line
with those of children, or vice versa. Instead it is to ventilate the po-
tential reasons behind the different legal protections, so that strategic
use could be made of them in the future. When we understand the
motivation for different legal protection, we can identify when adverse
legal protections are reasonable and when they are not, and thus
more persuasive and deliberate about how we work to advance such
protections where they are lacking.
110. CAL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 5.
111. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
112. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 200.
113. 2011 Cal. Stat. 1914; Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Brown Signs Bill Requiring Teaching of
Gay Accomplishments, POLITICAL: L.A. TIMES BLOG (Feb. 7, 2016, 11:28 AM), http://latimes-
blogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2011/07/governor-signs-bill-requiring-textbooks-to-
include-gay-accomplishments.html [https://perma.cc/U3SR-K6J3].
114. 2010 Cal Stat. 3447.
Issue 2] NO QUEER CHILD LEFT BEHIND 225
A. Discrimination and Harassment
Below I examine assimilation demands on adults in the work-
place, first to explain discrimination and harassment as assimilation
demands but also to lay the foundation for the claim that students
experiencing this type of assimilation demands are better off than
adults.
1. Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment in Employment:
Limited Protection for Adult Employees
Discrimination and harassment jurisprudence under Title IX
draws from its employment counterpart, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Like Title IX in the education context, Title VII prohibits
discrimination in employment opportunities and conditions because
of sex,115 whether in the form of disparate treatment or disparate im-
pact.116 An employer can defend its adverse decision by showing that
sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of that particular employer.117 As Title
VII does not mention sexual orientation or gender identity as grounds
for protection from discrimination in employment, as a result claim-
ants facing such discrimination have brought their cases under sex
discrimination theories, arguing that sexual orientation or gender
identity are considered problematic only when they do not align with
expectations as to what it means to be of a particular sex. Our under-
standing of “sexual orientation” or “gender identity” are then a func-
tion of our understanding of “sex.” As the argument goes, same-sex
sexual orientation is a basis for discrimination because had one been
of the opposite sex, her sexual orientation would have been accept-
able (i.e., it is acceptable for a man to be sexually attracted to or to
partner with women, but it is not acceptable for a woman to be at-
tracted to or to partner with women. Put differently, but for one’s sex,
her choice of partner would be a legitimate choice). Therefore, the
discrimination does not turn on sexual orientation but rather on the
sex of the persons involved. Hence, sexual orientation discrimination
is to be considered within the contours of sex discrimination. How-
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
116. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW
449 (3d ed., 2008) (explaining disparate treatment as the differential treatment of employ-
ees, whereas disparate impact refers to instituted policies that “while neutral on their face
have a negative and disproportionate effect on a protected class”).
117. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242–43 (1989). The BFOQ is also
understood as the business necessity test. One example of when the test could be satisfied
is when discrimination based on sex is imperative to the employer’s efficiency.
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ever, courts have rejected this argument, finding that the basis for dis-
crimination (i.e., disapproval of a same-sex relationship, applied
equally both to men (gays) and women (lesbians) and therefore did
not constitute sex discrimination).118 With this framing by courts, sex-
ual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination claims have been
generally unsuccessful,119 with the exception of the “sex stereotyping”
theory which has at times generated positive results for LGBT
claimants.120
The Supreme Court first recognized the “sex stereotypes” theory
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.121 Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at
Price Waterhouse, sued the firm for denying her partnership because
of her sex. Hopkins argued that despite her accomplishments and
contributions to the firm,122 she was denied partnership because she
did not conform to stereotypes regarding femininity in her demeanor
and presentation.123 Based on the partners’ comments about Hop-
kins, the Court found that the firm’s decision not to promote Hopkins
to partner was based on sex stereotypes,124 and that evaluating em-
ployees based on their conformity with stereotypes associated with
118. DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph, Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir.
1979). But see the latest moves by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), going in the opposite direction, as discussed below in Part III.D. See also Boso,
Acting Gay, supra note 73.
119. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329–30 (“Giving the statute its plain meaning . . . Congress
had only the traditional notions of “sex” in mind . . . . [I]n passing Title VII Congress did
not intend to protect sexual orientation and has repeatedly refused to extend such
protection.”).
120. But see Omar Gonzalez-Pagan & Ria Tobacco Mar, Laws Barring Sex Discrimination
Also Protect Sexual Orientation, N.Y. L. J., (Feb. 7, 2016, 11:45 AM), http://www.newyor-
klawjournal.com/id=1202747483046/?slreturn=20160021130214 (a review of the 2015 de-
cision of the EEOC that sexual orientation is in fact a form of “sex” for purposes of Title
VII) [https://perma.cc/LRF2-A8BC].
121. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. Under the “sex stereotypes” theory, employers ex-
pected employees to perform at their jobs while still conducting themselves according to
stereotypes associated with their sex. Employers who penalized employees for failing to
conform to sex stereotypes could be held liable for sex discrimination. Ann Hopkins,
therefore, was expected to be an effective professional (presumably, perform as well as a
man) but do so while maintaining her femininity.
122. Id. at 233–34. Hopkins was considered to perform at “partner level,” worked long
hours, was a “highly competent project leader” and landed a $25 million contract for the
firm.
123. Id. at 235. Partners found her too aggressive and abrasive for a woman, recom-
mended she take a “course in charm school” and that she “walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry.” Id.
124. Id. at 250 (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on
the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted
on the basis of gender.”).
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their group was an impermissible measure of evaluation under Title
VII.125
Since Price Waterhouse, LGBT plaintiffs have tried, with mixed re-
sults, to utilize the sex stereotypes theory to pave the way for inclusion
of sexual orientation discrimination under the sex discrimination pro-
tections of Title VII.126 Success has been more notable in cases of sex-
ual harassment, a subset of sex discrimination. At the time Price
Waterhouse was decided, in order to make the case that one had suf-
fered sexual harassment she would have to show, in addition to having
been discriminated against because of sex, that she endured one of
two types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo or hostile environment.
Quid pro quo cases are those where the employer conditions employ-
ment, firing, demoting or promoting upon engaging in a sexual rela-
tionship with the employee,127 or that her work conditions or
continued employment status are such because the employee would
not acquiesce to her supervisor’s unwanted sexual advances.128 A hos-
tile environment case concerns work conditions that are sufficiently
hostile to members of one sex so as to make it difficult for the
harassed parties to perform at work. The harassment must be severe
or pervasive, must be objectively hostile according to a reasonable per-
son standard as well as subjectively hostile to the specific victim.129
125. Id. at 251 (“[A] number of the partners’ comments showed sex stereotyping at
work. As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an em-
ployer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype
associated with their group . . . . Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”).
126. An example of successful application of the sex stereotyping theory to sexual ori-
entation is Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that the sex
stereotypes theory “would not bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII
because not all homosexual men are stereotypically feminine, and not all heterosexual
men are stereotypically masculine. But, under this theory, relief would be available for
discrimination based upon sexual stereotypes.”). However, an example of the rejection of
the sex stereotypes theory as protecting from sexual orientation discrimination is Dawson v.
Bumble & Bumble, where the employee, a hair assistant sued her employer, a hair salon,
claiming she was discriminated against because she was a lesbian whose overall appearance
was masculine. 398 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2005). The court held that to the extent that the
employee was alleging discrimination based on her sexual orientation, she could not satisfy
the first element of a prima facie case under Title VII because it did not recognize LGBT
persons as a protected class. Id. See also Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080,
2015 WL 4397641 (July 15, 2015); see discussion below in Part III.D.; and, see also Boso,
Acting Gay, supra note 73.
127. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 116, at 450.
128. The Court moved toward this doctrine, the “tangible employment action” doc-
trine, in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
129. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 116, at 450.
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In Rene v. MGM Grand,130 the court considered the same-sex sex-
ual harassment of a gay employee who was harassed by fellow employ-
ees for over two years.131 The court found that the victim’s sexual
orientation was irrelevant in sexual harassment claims,132 and that
demonstrating that the harassment was of a sexual nature was suffi-
cient to establish a sexual harassment claim.133 The concurring opin-
ion adopted the sex stereotypes theory, finding that Rene’s co-workers
treated him as they would a woman and that the abusive treatment
related to Rene’s gender.134 The dissent, however, rejected both op-
tions and maintained that Rene’s harassment was not protected under
Title VII because according to Rene’s own testimony it was harassment
because of sexual orientation.135 The feminine conduct that Rene ex-
hibited was rooted in his sexual orientation and therefore the dissent
viewed his sexual orientation as the real motive behind the harass-
ment.136 The dissent also rejected Rene’s sexual harassment claim be-
cause it was inconsistent with the options of prohibited same-sex
sexual harassment that the Supreme Court had articulated in Oncale v.
Sundowner.137
In Oncale, the Supreme Court considered whether same-sex sex-
ual harassment, in addition to opposite-sex sexual harassment, could
be protected under Title VII. There, the employee sued his employer
for failing to protect him from sexual harassment and sexual assaults
he endured while working on an all-male oil platform.138 The Court
130. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002).
131. Id. at 1064 (“The harassers’ conduct included whistling and blowing kisses at
Rene, calling him ‘sweetheart’ and ‘muneca’ (Spanish for ‘doll’), telling crude jokes and
giving sexually oriented ‘joke’ gifts, and forcing Rene to look at pictures of naked men
having sex. On ‘more times than [Rene said he] could possibly count,’ the harassment
involved offensive physical conduct of a sexual nature. Rene gave deposition testimony that
he was caressed and hugged and that his coworkers would ‘touch [his] body like they
would to a woman.’ On numerous occasions, he said, they grabbed him in the crotch and
poked their fingers in his anus through his clothing. When asked what he believed was the
motivation behind this harassing behavior, Rene responded that the behavior occurred
because he is gay.”).
132. Id. at 1066.
133. Id. at 1068.
134. Id. at 1068–69 (Preggerson, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 1077 (Hug, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1072–73 (discussing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S 75
(1998)).
138. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77 (“On several occasions, Oncale was forcibly subjected to sex-
related, humiliating actions against him . . . in the presence of the rest of the crew. [Two
co-workers] also physically assaulted Oncale in a sexual manner, and [one of them]
threatened him with rape.”).
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ruled that nothing in Title VII bars anti-discrimination protection sim-
ply because the harasser and victim are of the same sex.139 However,
the Court limited the scope of this protection to three possible scena-
rios. The first scenario for possible same-sex sexual harassment, acting
under the basic assumption that sexual harassment is motivated by
sexual desire, would require the harasser to have a same-sex sexual
orientation.140 However, conceding that not all sexual harassment is
motivated by desire alone, the second scenario considers that animus
to the presence of members of one sex as a group in the workplace
may motivate harassment. Therefore, hostile or derogatory treatment
that is sex-specific toward an employee of the same-sex could consti-
tute sexual harassment.141 In the third scenario, harassment is di-
rected only to members of one sex in a mixed-sex workplace.142 The
Court then remanded the case for factual findings on whether the
circumstances at hand fit into any of these three scenarios.
Yoshino offers an assimilation demands perspective to these cases
that further illuminates the difficulty in relying on sex discrimination
claims to protect sexual orientation. Yoshino observes that Hopkins
was, in essence, caught in a double bind—or as he puts it, reverse-
covering. Reverse-covering is Yoshino’s term for situations where the
dominant group imposes assimilation demands on the minority, pres-
suring one to flaunt her minority status, traits and characteristics and
to conform to stereotypes associated with that minority group.143
At the same time, Hopkins was experiencing pressures at her
workplace both to cover her femininity (by being an aggressive, go-
getting business woman) and to flaunt it (wear make-up and jewelry,
and attend charm-school).144 Her superiors expected her to bring the
139. Id. at 79.
140. Id. at 80 (“Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to
draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct
typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume
those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex. The same chain of
inference would be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment, if there were cred-
ible evidence that the harasser was homosexual.”).
141. Id. (“But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably find such
discrimination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and deroga-
tory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace.”).
142. Id. at 80–81 (“A same-sex harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct
comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a
mixed-sex workplace.”).
143. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 143–44.
144. Id. at 155.
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results any man would, but to go about accomplishing those results as
an attractive woman would.145 When she failed to walk the fine line
between covering and reverse-covering, the partners penalized her by
denying her partnership. Finding that this form of discrimination—
the double bind—falls under Title VII, the Court implied that Hop-
kins could not have balanced differently the assimilation demands she
faced. Yet, Yoshino asserts that Hopkins’ ability to cover and reverse-
cover simultaneously should be immaterial. Suggesting that the de-
mands Hopkins’ encountered were motivated by an attempt to pre-
serve stereotypical gender roles, Yoshino maintains that protection
from covering and reverse covering demands that are contingent on
the existence of a double bind (i.e., that both types of demands must
co-exist) leaves subjects of assimilation demands vulnerable.146 In sup-
port, he notes that his research yielded “no federal Title VII case after
Hopkins in which a ‘feminine’ woman prevailed against an affect-based
covering demand on sex-stereotyping grounds.”147 The law, therefore,
continues to condone the requirement that women and gay men per-
form their minority identities, as a way to maintain male dominance
in the workplace. When the standard for professional success is still
the straight man, but the expected methods to gain success are mea-
sured against one’s minority identity, the result is both a personal and
social harm. Women and gay people must still conduct themselves in
ways that are pleasing, or at least non-threatening, to straight men and
their masculinity. Female and gay identities are thus devalued and ob-
jectified so that power imbalances and hierarchical relationships,
dominated by straight men, can remain the prevalent social order.
The dissenting opinion in Rene, which generally falls in line with
most other cases addressing the possibility of Title VII protection for
sexual orientation discrimination,148 suggests an additional reason to
145. Id. at 145, 149 (“In many workplaces, women are pressured to be ‘masculine’
enough to be respected as workers, but also to be ‘feminine’ enough to be respected as
women . . . . If women are not ‘masculine’ enough to be respected as workers, they will be
asked to cover. If they are not ‘feminine’ enough to be respected as women, they will be
asked to reverse cover.”).
146. Id. at 161.
147. Id. at 161 (“I could find no federal Title VII case . . . in which a ‘feminine’ woman
prevailed against an affect-based covering demand on sex-stereotyping ground. This find-
ing suggests what women have in common with gays and racial minorities: a profound legal
vulnerability to the demand that they cover the behaviors stereotypically associated with
their group.”).
148. For cases reaching similar conclusions regarding sexual orientation harassment as
unprotected under Title VII, see Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, 194 F.3d 252 (1st
Cir. 1999); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000); Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001). But see Centola v. Potter, 183 F.Supp.2d 403
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exercise care when relying on sex discrimination claims to protect sex-
ual orientation discrimination. The dissent rejects the argument that
sexual orientation is encompassed in sex, and maintains that Title VII
precludes protection to employees harassed because of their sexual
orientation.149 In rejecting the possibility that Rene had been
harassed because of his effeminacy—his nonconformity to male sex
stereotypes—the dissent opines that Rene was performing his gender
in feminine ways because of his sexual orientation.150 In assimilation
demands terms, the dissent saw the harassment as if Rene’s co-work-
ers’ demanded he cover his sexual orientation, not reverse-cover his
masculinity—a covering demand that the dissent finds permissible
under Title VII. Interestingly, by failing to protect Rene from this cov-
ering demand the dissent effectively imposes on Rene (and through
him, on other potential gay or lesbian litigants) a passing demand;
that Rene’s sexual orientation was known to his co-workers and to the
court seemed material for the dissent’s conclusion that Title VII was
not applicable. Perhaps if neither knew of Rene’s sexual orientation,
the dissent would have entertained the covering demand as sexual
harassment prohibited by Title VII and would have found in favor of
Rene. Perhaps not. Still this possibility creates a passing demand as it
discourages gays and lesbians from coming out in the workplace, and
then later, in court.
2. Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment in Education:
Greater Protections for Schoolchildren
Courts heavily borrow from the adult employment context to re-
solve sex discrimination and harassment cases in school. LGBT stu-
dents have generally been more successful in court than adults; this
reflects a policy to extend greater protection to children, even when
parallel claims by adults fail. Undoubtedly, the success of litigation
efforts is an important feat for the LGBT rights movement. Despite
these important accomplishments, however, the statistics on school
climate for LGBT youth—which have gone down in recent years151—
remain alarming; statutory protections are not in place in many states
(some have even rolled back on protections), and cases continue to
(D.Mass. 2002) (finding that sexual orientation discrimination, alongside sex discrimina-
tion, should not be held against the plaintiff).
149. Rene, 305 F.3d at 1075–76 (Hug, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1077–78.
151. See and compare the data below, e.g. infra notes.
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be brought to courts.152 So, although courts crack down on schools
and educators more aggressively than on employers, the LGBT move-
ment’s litigation strategy has only served as a partial cure for school-
based assimilation demands. Still, in order to design future strategies,
it is worth considering the achievements so far.
Below are four examples for how courts better protect LGBT stu-
dents from discrimination and harassment (a fifth example, in regard
to speech will be discussed in the next part): (1) courts have not re-
quired that students demonstrate suffering a double bind when apply-
ing the sex stereotyping theory in their favor;153 (2) courts have more
readily restricted same-sex sexual harassment;154 (3) courts have been
more willing to interpret “sex” to include sexual orientation or gender
identity;155 and (4) even before Lawrence v. Texas156 was decided,
criminalization of sodomy was not accepted as a justification for dis-
crimination or harassment of students.157 However, there is one way
in which courts put obstacles in the way of students raising discrimina-
tion or harassment claims that is not present in adult cases: students
must demonstrate that their academic achievement has been affected
by the mistreatment.158 Adults, on the other hand, need not show any
adverse impact to their performance at work. Still, by extending
stronger protections to students, courts effectively recognize chil-
dren’s identity interests in the educational environment, their height-
ened vulnerability to assimilation demands, and their greater need for
legal protections from such demands.
Social science findings on the effects of bias against lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender persons, or others who have relationships
with LGBT persons,159 expressed through discrimination or harass-
ment, reveal the particularly harmful effect on those experiencing it.
Schools that have committed to combating homophobia mitigate its
152. Consider recent litigation around HB-2, as well as G.G. v. Gloucester County
School Board, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S. Oct. 28,
2016) (No. 16–273), pending at the United State Supreme Court (as of February 2017), see
https://www.aclu.org/cases/gg-v-gloucester-county-school-board [https://perma.cc/T2W
Y-U5V2].
153. See infra Part II.A.2.i.
154. See infra Part II.A.2.ii.
155. See infra Part II.A.2.iii.
156. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
157. See infra Part II.A.2.iv.
158. See infra Part II.A.2.
159. Homophobia negatively affects students who have relationships with LGBT per-
sons as well. For instance the pervasive use of the term “gay” or the phrase “you’re/that’s so
gay” as an insult or negative reference, can be emotionally detrimental and an infringe-
ment of educational rights of students whose parents, friends or relatives are LGBT.
Issue 2] NO QUEER CHILD LEFT BEHIND 233
harms and facilitate safer school environments. At 64.5%, a majority
of students participating in school climate surveys160 reported hearing
homophobic remarks, with 51.5% hearing them from school staff.161
A majority of students also reported that they experienced incidents
of harassment and assault at school.162 The findings show school per-
sonnel intervening at strikingly low rates. Overall, over a half (55.5%)
of participating students reported they felt unsafe in school because of
their sexual orientation, and 38.7% reported feeling unsafe because
of their gender expression.163 Almost half (43.3%) of students have
reported these incidents to school staff,164 yet about two thirds of re-
porting students (61.6%) said school staff had taken no effective ac-
tion or no action at all.165 About a third (32.5%) of students
explained they do not report incidents because they doubt any effec-
tive intervention would be made, or because they feared making the
situation worse (23.7%).166 When schools adopted comprehensive
policies addressing issues relating specifically to sexual orientation
and gender identity, incidences of discrimination and harassment de-
creased and school staff effectively intervened at higher rates.167
Anti-LGBT verbal and physical harassment are alarmingly wide-
spread in American schools. Of participating students, 64.5% in the
national school climate survey reported hearing derogatory remarks
referencing sexual orientation or gender identity often, including
more than half (51.4%) who reported hearing remarks made by
school staff.168 Over half (56.4%) of participating students also heard
transphobic remarks, and a similar number (55.5%) reported hearing
such remarks from school staff.169 Seventy-four point one percent re-
port having been harassed at school because of their actual or per-
ceived sexual orientation, and 55.2% report the same regarding
160. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at 16 (Compare to 88.9% in 2009. SURVEY 2009, supra
note 102, at XVI.).
161. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at 16 (Compare to about two-thirds in 2009. SURVEY
2009, supra note 102.).
162. SURVEY 2013, supra note 1052, at xvi–xvii.
163. Id. at 12 (Compare to 61.1% and 39.9%, respectively in 2009. SURVEY 2009, supra
note 102.).
164. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at 28 (Compare to 63.7% in 2009. SURVEY 2009, supra
note 102.).
165. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at 34 (Compare to 38.8% in 2009. SURVEY 2009, supra
note 102.).
166. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at 29.
167. Id. at 61, 76.
168. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at 16.
169. Id. at 18, 19.
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gender identity.170 Sixteen and one-half percent were physically as-
saulted because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation and
11.4% assaulted because of their gender identity or expression.171
There are two main forms of discrimination relevant to LGBT
students. The first is sexual orientation discrimination: the differential
treatment of students because of actual or perceived sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity compared to other straight or perceived to be
straight students. The second is sex discrimination because of their
sex: when students or school staff treat male students differently than
female students in similar situations, or the other way around. Dis-
crimination, whether on the basis of sexual orientation or sex, refers
also to unequal enforcement. Schools that are subject to state anti-
discrimination laws or regulations (mandated by the state or the
school board) must enforce them on an equal basis.172
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act173 prohibits public,
federally-funded schools from discriminating in access or conditions
of education on the basis of sex.174 In addition to this federal prohibi-
tion on sex discrimination, some states have opted to protect against
sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination and harassment
in their state laws. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia prohibit
discrimination or harassment in education on the basis of sexual ori-
entation or gender identity,175 and one additional state enumerated
only sexual orientation as prohibited grounds for discrimination or
harassment in schools.176 Other states have enacted anti-bullying and
safe schools statutes that protect students from violence regardless of
170. Id. at 22.
171. Id. at 23. Compared to 18.8% and 12.5%, respectively in 2009. SCHOOL CLIMATE
SURVEY 2009, supra note 102, at 27.
172. See Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1137–38 (9th Cir.
2003).
173. Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
174. Id. (Stating the general prohibition against discrimination: “No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
175. States that protect students from discrimination and harassment because of their
sexual orientation or gender identity include: California, Colorado, Connecticut, District
of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Vermont, Washington, and Oregon. Human Rights Campaign, Maps of State Laws
and Policies: Statewide School Non-Discrimination Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN
(Feb. 7, 2016, 11:58 AM), http://www.hrc.org/state_maps (providing details of state stat-
utes that protect LGBT students against discrimination, harassment or bullying, and those
states that do not offer such protections) [https://perma.cc/T9D3-4MMV].
176. Wisconsin has a statute protecting students from discrimination and harassment
because of sexual orientation alone. Wis. Stat. § 118.13 (2008).
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its reason, though some may cover sexual orientation and gender
identity, while others explicitly prevent protection on these bases.177
Where such laws are not in place students have only Title IX to rely on
for protection, and the question of whether “sex” includes sexual ori-
entation or gender identity bares even more significance.178
Title IX prohibits discrimination and harassment in educational
environments on the basis of sex.179 For discrimination to fall under
Title IX, it must be motivated by the student’s gender or their non-
conformity to stereotypical behavior associated with their sex, as was
the case in Price Waterhouse. Another way discrimination can come
under Title IX, where sexual orientation is concerned, is through sex-
ual harassment. Harassment in this context takes place when students
are mistreated or bullied by other students or by school faculty or staff
because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Research sug-
gests that school faculty or staff fail to intervene and even blame the
harassed students for bringing it on themselves.180 In doing so, school
faculty or staff violate their obligation to supervise and act reasonably
toward students. When students are injured while in school care and
the injury is related to school employees’ acts or failures to act, both
the employees and the school district are exposed to liability under
Title IX.181
Sexual harassment is harassment that involves sexual references
or behavior meant to humiliate a student, regardless of their actual or
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.182 The harassment
must be severe and pervasive enough to effectively deny a student ac-
177. States with general anti-bullying laws and policies that cover LGBT students are:
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. States with gen-
eral anti-bullying laws and policy that prevent school districts from specifically protecting
LGBT students are Missouri and South Dakota. Maps of State Laws and Policies: Statewide
School Anti-Bullying Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Feb. 7, 2016, 12:00 PM),
http://www.hrc.org/state_maps [https://perma.cc/T9D3-4MMV].
178. Notably, however, this issue of the meaning of “sex” in Title IX protection is rele-
vant in all states, as it is a federal statute and claims against all federally-funded schools can
rest on its provisions, sometimes in addition to those embodied in state anti-discrimination
laws. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
179. Id.
180. BIEGEL, supra note 95, at 17, 52 n.31 (discussing lawsuits brought by students
against school personnel that were either won or settled in favor of the students).
181. Id. at 26 (reviewing generally Glaser v. Emporia Unified Sch. Dist. No. 253, 21
P.3d 573 (Kan. 2001); Carny v. Cedar Bluffs Junior/Senior Pub. Sch., 679 N.W.2d 198
(Neb. 2004)).
182. Rachmilovitz, Masters, supra note 19, at 90–91.
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cess to education.183 Over half (59.3%) of students participating in
the national school climate survey reported having been sexually
harassed.184 The harasser and victim do not have to be of different
sexes for such harassment to constitute sexual harassment.185 A school
district is liable for the sexual harassment of one student by others if
the school knew about the harassment and was deliberately indiffer-
ent to the harassment that was severe and pervasive enough to deprive
the victim access to education.186
Yet this outcome requirement effectively hinders students’ pro-
tection and no parallel requirement exists for adults regarding their
performance at work. Protecting only severe and pervasive harassment
means that harassment that is limited to one incident, however severe,
may not lead to the school being found liable for failure to protect the
student.187 Conversely, repeated harassment that the court might find
innocuous could also result in a school escaping liability.188 Moreover,
a particularly bright or poor student, who suffers harassment without
it hindering her academics (namely, that her grades had not
dropped) would then also be left unprotected under this test. Lastly,
arguably the greatest obstacle for protection is the requirement that a
school be found “deliberately indifferent” to the harassment.189 This
might not be easily demonstrated to a court unless the abuse has hap-
pened during class, or when there is a record of reporting to school
183. Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 394 F.Supp.2d 1299, 1308–309
(D. Kan. 2005).
184. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at 24 (compared to 68.2% of the survey participants
reporting experiencing sexual harassment in 2009. SURVEY 2009, supra note 102, at 27).
185. Oona R.-S. . v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1998); Kinman v. Omaha
Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996); Torres v. Nat’l Precision Blanking, 943
F.Supp. 952, 956 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Rodkey v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 1997 WL 823568, at
*22–26 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 7, 1997).
186. Murell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999).
187. A California student was expelled from school for giving a hickey to another fe-
male student. The school maintains it has a duty to expel the student for sexual harass-
ment of another student. The student argues that this is not sufficient grounds for
expulsion because—in addition to her belief that the sexual activity between the two stu-
dents was in fact consensual – it was an isolated incident and therefore does not rise to the
level of harassment under the Title IX “pervasive” standard. Interview with Asaf Orr, for-
mer staff attorney, Learning Rights Law Center, in Los Angeles, Cal. (Oct. 12, 2010) (Orr
served as the student’s attorney representative).
188. A suit by a female student who was repeatedly addressed in derogatory terms by
fellow students (“slut,” “whore”) failed because the court believed this was not “severe”
harassment for the purposes of Title IX. Id.
189. See generally, Asaf Orr, Harassment and Hostility: Determining the Proper Standard of
Liability for Discriminatory Peer-to-Peer Harassment of Youth in Schools, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
117 (2008).
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personnel.190 Such a requirement, too, is not in place for employment
discrimination or harassment cases.
i. No Double Bind Requirement
Despite the limits of Title IX, students have prevailed in their
claims against schools. One case where a student won a harassment
suit against his school based on the sex stereotype theory was Theno v.
Tonganoxie.191 Dylan Theno suffered harassment from fellow students
that was centered around name calling, derogatory remarks about his
sexual orientation, and mimicking same-sex sexual activities.192 The
harassment went on for four years, often in class in the presence of
teachers, and escalated to physical violence on at least one occa-
sion.193 The school argued that the harassment was not motivated by
Theno’s sex, or by his atypical gender performance, but rather that
his behavior, style, and interests were socially atypical and therefore
unacceptable to his peers.194 Additionally, the harassment was not mo-
tivated by sex, but rather was the other students’ attempt to be funny
by focusing on a socially awkward subject matter.195 At trial, Theno
expressed his belief that he was harassed because he “wasn’t an alpha
male” and that the other boys saw him as a “girly girl.”196 The court
agreed that the harassment was motivated by the students’ disapproval
of Theno’s gender performance.197 They harassed him, the court
found, because he did not conform to expectations regarding how a
teenage boy should act.198 Consequently, the harassment was meant to
undermine Theno’s masculinity. Using in effect the sex stereotyping
190. However, when the harassment takes place outside the classroom (perhaps in the
hallway, restrooms, or school bus) where faculty and staff might not be present, when the
harassed student does not report the harassment to school officials, or when the school
takes limited and futile action, the standard proves itself too high to properly motivate
vigilant action and protection by the schools. Id.
191. 394 F.Supp.2d 1299 (D. Kan. 2005).
192. Id. at 1305–06 (Other students called Theno “fag,” “flamer,” “sissy,” “queer,” “mas-
turbator,” etc. They started a rumor that he was caught masturbating in the restrooms,
often made remarks in reference and peeked over the restroom stalls to “make sure you’re
not masturbating in there.” On one occasion, at lunchtime, one student handed Theno a
banana, saying: “Here you stupid faggot. Why don’t you shove this up your ass? I’m sure
you’ll like it.” On a different occasion, another student put a piece of string cheese in his
mouth and said, “Look at this. I’m Dylan sucking cock.”).
193. Id. at 1305–06.
194. Id. at 1304 (Theno had an unusual hair style, wore earrings and took an interest
in martial arts. He also dropped out of the school’s football team.).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1306–07.
197. Id. at 1307.
198. Id.
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theory, the court ruled that this was sexual harassment prohibited
under Title IX and held the school liable for not protecting Theno.
Similar to the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse, Theno was harassed as
an assimilation demand; the other boys found his gender perform-
ance non-conforming and therefore pressured him, through harass-
ment, to assimilate to their expectations. Theno’s actual sexual
orientation or whether he identified as gender non-conforming is not
explicitly mentioned in the opinion. If in fact he was gay or gender
non-conforming, the harassment could be viewed as a demand to
cover his sexual orientation (or, if he was gay, but his sexual orienta-
tion was unknown to his fellow students, this was a passing demand) as
the harassment communicated to Theno that being gay was a basis for
ridicule and shaming. On the other hand, if Theno was straight, the
demands he faced were reverse-covering demands—the demand that
he present his masculinity to a heightened degree. Notably, however,
Theno was pressured toward one or the other. Unlike Ann Hopkins,
Theno did not suffer a double bind. Yet the court still applied the sex
stereotyping theory to protect him where adults would likely remain
unprotected under current case law. This suggests that Yoshino’s hy-
pothesis that absent a double bind, subjects of covering or reverse-
covering are left vulnerable might be limited to adults because courts
have found assimilation demands and sex stereotyping harmful to
children even when only one form of them exists. Perhaps courts are
more willing to protect children from assimilation demands that con-
stitute sex stereotyping due to their general vulnerability at this stage
of identity development and their dependence on adults.199 Allowing
students to recover without being subjected to a double bind may re-
flect courts’ acknowledgment that children who are still forming their
identity have a greater interest in legal protection of their identity for-
mation in an environment free from assimilation demands, and that
such demands are overly burdensome in and of themselves and that
subjecting students—whose coping mechanisms and resilience skills
199. For another case where the court considered a sex stereotyping claim as a basis for
Title IX protection absent a double bind, see Doe v. Southeastern Greene Sch. Dist., 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12790 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2006). There, the court denied the school’s
motion for summary judgment as the court found that evidence of derogatory name-call-
ing related to the student’s sexual orientation, stabbing his behind with a pencil, mastur-
bating in front of him and requesting he perform oral sex on the other student was
sufficient for “a jury [to] find that his harassment was ‘so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it can be said to deprive the victim of access to the educational opportunities
or benefits provided by the school.’” Id. at *22. The court allowed the student to proceed
with his Title IX sex discrimination claim. Id.; see also Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
709, 109 F.Supp.2d 1081 (D.Minn. 2000).
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are still developing—to the requirement to rebuff conflicting de-
mands may be far beyond their capabilities.
ii. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
The courts’ greater willingness to advance protections against sex
discrimination for children above and beyond those for LGBT adults
is evident again in the case of Nabozny v. Podlesny.200 Despite rejecting
similar claims in adult contexts, the formal sex discrimination argu-
ment led to findings in favor of the harassed student.201 After coming
out in seventh grade, Nabozny began experiencing harassment from
his fellow students, both verbally and physically.202 Over time, the har-
assment grew worse, culminating in two students pushing Nabozny to
the floor and performing a mock rape on him in class in front of
about 20 other students.203 During the mock rape the two harassers
expressed that Nobozny “should enjoy it.”204 When Nabozny reported
the incident to the principal (who was also in charge of school disci-
pline) she replied that “boys will be boys” and that if Nabozny was to
be out as a gay student, he should expect this sort of treatment.205 The
harassment continued throughout middle school and into high
school with more beatings, students throwing dangerous objects at
him, and forcing him into a urinal.206 The school continued to over-
look the harassment, which drove Nabozny to attempt suicide on at
least two separate occasions.207 School officials repeatedly told Na-
bozny that being an openly gay student, he should expect the harass-
200. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
201. As the argument goes, but for the victim’s sex, she would not have suffered the
disparate treatment. In Rene, the argument was that had Rene been a woman his harassers
would not have mistreated him for his effeminacy. The majority and concurrence found in
favor of Rene on other grounds. The dissent, as discussed above, refused to see the case as
sex discrimination, but rather sexual orientation discrimination that is not prohibited by
Title VII. On the other hand, in Nabozny, a similar argument held up in court. 92 F.3d 446
(7th Cir. 1996). In another case, Flores, the court again found that schools have a duty to
protect LGB students from harassment in the same manner that they must protect straight
students. Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). Further,
schools have a duty to enforce any school policy in regards to LGB students as much as that
duty exists in regards to straight students. Id. at 1137.
202. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 451 (“Nabozny’s classmates regularly referred to him as ‘fag-
got,’ and subjected him to various forms of physical abuse, including striking and spitting
on him.”).
203. Id. at 451.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 451–52.
207. Id. at 451–52.
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ment and they suggested he take time off from school.208 They later
altered his schedule so that he would have limited contact with his
harassers and eventually placed him in a special education class.209
Finally, Nabozny dropped out of school in the eleventh grade.
Nabozny made a constitutional Equal Protection claim and ar-
gued that had he been a female student, the school would have ad-
dressed the harassment.210 He submitted evidence that when boys
physically assaulted girls, or addressed them in derogatory ways that
invoked their gender, the school acted aggressively to stop that harass-
ment.211 The court took particular issue with the school’s response to
the mock rape, opining that the comment “boys will be boys” demon-
strates that the school did not consider that act to be serious because
the students involved, and Nabozny, were male.212 This indicated to
the court that had the victim been a female student, the school would
not have reacted with such indifference. This finding differs from pro-
tections grounded in sex stereotyping theory. It emphasizes formal
equality (i.e., a male student compared to a female student) as op-
posed to substantive protections for differential identity protections
(i.e., an effeminate boy compared to masculine boys).
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court found that absent an
important governmental interest, the school indeed was required to
treat the harassment the same as if it targeted a female student.213
Though this is not explicit in the opinion, effectively, the court ap-
plied the Oncale rule regarding same-sex harassment. One of the cate-
gories for impermissible same-sex harassment under Oncale is that
members of one sex are suffering harassment that is not imposed on
208. Id. at 452. After one occasion when Nabozny was kicked in the stomach repeatedly
for 10 minutes, a school staffer to whom Nabozny complained laughed and told Nabozny
that Nabozny deserved such treatment because he was gay. Id.
209. Id.
210. Nabozny also made a due process claim. However, in the interest of focusing on
discrimination/harassment jurisprudence, I only discuss the equal protection claim here.
In short, Nabozny’s claim, that the school created or exacerbated his risk of harm by failing
to act against his harassers, was rejected by the court for lack of persuasive evidence. Id. at
459–60.
211. Id. at 454 (“Nabozny contends that a male student that struck his girlfriend was
immediately expelled, that males were reprimanded for striking girls, and that when preg-
nant girls were called ‘slut’ or ‘whore,’ the school took action.”).
212. Id. at 454–55 (“[W]hen he was subjected to a mock rape [the principal] re-
sponded by saying ‘boys will be boys,’ apparently dismissing the incident because both the
perpetrators and the victim were males. We find it impossible to believe that a female
lodging a similar complaint would have received the same response.”).
213. Id. at 456.
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members of the other sex.214 When the court accepts Nabozny’s argu-
ment that the school would have taken action were the harassed stu-
dents girls, it essentially applies Oncale. However, that Oncale is not
referenced in the case, and although there is no discussion of the cat-
egories under which same-sex harassment may be impermissible, sug-
gests that the Nabozny court perhaps is more lenient with the child
than it may have been with an adult, who presumably would have
been required to explicitly take the step of demonstrating how being
harassed by people of the same-sex is consistent with the Oncale
precedent.
iii. “Sex” Means “Sexual Orientation”
The Nabozny court addressed the possibility of sexual orientation
discrimination as well. Here, the court applied rational basis review, as
it declined to determine whether sexual orientation is a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification, and relied on precedents applying rational
basis review to sexual orientation discrimination.215 Even with this
lower standard, the court found no rational basis for allowing one stu-
dent to harass another because of sexual orientation.216 Further, the
court rejects the possibility that the Supreme Court ruling in Bowers v.
Hardwick217 provides a rational basis for the discrimination in Nabozny.
Under Bowers, criminalization of sodomy could render gay students
dissimilarly situated to straight students and the school’s discrimina-
tion permissible.218 However, the court did not substantively examine
this suggestion. Instead, it admonished the school for relying on Bow-
ers as authority for the appropriate standard of review, without sug-
gesting Bowers, or any other precedent, as the rational basis to justify
their disparate treatment of Nabozny.219 The court ruled in the stu-
dent’s favor and found school staff accountable for failing to protect
him from harassment.220
The Nabozny court is primarily concerned with two forms of assim-
ilation demands: passing and conversion. School personnel to whom
Nabozny reported the abuse dismissed his complaints by telling him
that being an out gay student meant being harassed and that violent
214. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80–81.
215. Id. at 458.
216. Id. at 458.
217. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the constitution-
ality of state criminal anti-sodomy laws).
218. See Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 458.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 455–56.
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responses from peers were to be expected. Such an argument at-
tempts to excuse any failure to act against the harasser. It delegi-
timizes LGBT students’ right to express and reveal their sexuality and
violates students’ right to be safe at school—regardless of identity. It
uses the justification of violence as a valid response to one’s openness
about a seemingly inferior, undesirable identity—a highly threatening
passing demand. And as a passing demand, the school’s response is in
and of itself a discriminatory action. The court, though not explicitly,
seems to see that. The court reiterates that Nabozny got this response
from several school staff, though this pattern was not necessarily mate-
rial for a holding based on sex stereotyping discrimination.221 Unlike
the dissenting opinion in Rene, the court did not see Nabozny’s open-
ness about his sexual orientation as reason to reject his sex discrimina-
tion claim. The court did not insist that this was actually sexual
orientation discrimination and therefore outside the contours of Title
IX. This is another example of how courts protect children more fully
than adults in similar circumstances.
iv. Criminalization of Sodomy Not a Defense
The Nabozny court also offered protection to LGBT students
where it is denied to adults in its discussion of Bowers as a potential
rational basis for the school’s failure to act against Nabozny’s harass-
ment. Anti-sodomy criminalization has served society as a legal tool to
convert LGBT persons into heterosexuality.222 Yoshino argues that
while conversion demands have subsided over the years for adults,
they are often still in full force when children’s sexuality is con-
cerned.223 And while Lawrence v. Texas has indeed eliminated the
criminalization of adult same-sex sodomy, it has not—at least not ex-
plicitly—done the same for same-sex sexual conduct involving (or be-
tween) teens. Though the conversion rationale might still hold in
221. The response the court did see as determinative was the principal’s statement that
“boys will be boys,” insinuating that had girls been involved there would be cause for con-
cern and action by the school. Id. at 454–55. The court expressly relies on this statement,
rather than those indicating that harassment of an openly gay student is to be expected, to
find in favor of Nabozny’s sex discrimination claim. Id.
222. Like marriage, bars on same-sex sexual activity “substantially burden the right to
choose homosexual relations and relationships” and are a means for the law to channel
one into heteronormative behavior. In this sense they are a legal tool of conversion. See
generally, Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An Argument from Bisexuality,
49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415 (2012); YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 41 (discussing immigration
law as another example for legal strategies of “gay conversion.”).
223. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 44–45.
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other contexts224 the Nabozny court eliminates the potential argu-
ment that conversion is a rational basis for harassment of LGBT stu-
dents. Notably, it does so in a time when conversion demands on
adults (i.e. the criminalization of sodomy) were still upheld by the
Supreme Court. Regardless of whether the Nabozny court assumed
LGBT students were not involved in same-sex sexual activity due to
their age or saw them merely as potential violators of anti-sodomy stat-
utes needing to be deterred from such activity (in Yoshino terms, chil-
dren are “classic sexual waverers”),225 the court would not entertain
the merits of sodomy criminalization as a rational basis for harass-
ment. The message is that students must be protected from their
peers’ abusive behavior even if that behavior would be acceptable
against adults because the state is entitled to criminalize that adult’s
conduct. Once more, children are afforded more legal protection
than adults.
So far, we have seen four ways in which courts better protect stu-
dents from discrimination and harassment in education than their
LGBT adult counterparts in employment. Before exploring more in
depth why this may be—that is, what it is about children and educa-
tion that inspires courts to extend protection where adults may not
enjoy it—it is worth exploring another context, that of free speech, in
which courts both roll back children’s rights compared to adults in
that their speech must not undermine the educational setting, but
also remove important obstacles common in first amendment cases
from schoolchildren’s way: the community standards test.
B. Sexual Minority Students’ Free Speech: Hybrid Protections
A common area of discrimination against LGBT students con-
cerns freedom of speech and expression. Although students are not
stripped of their freedom of speech while at school, there are limits
on children’s free expression rights that seem more far-reaching than
restrictions on adults’ speech. Primarily, students’ free expression
must not conflict with the characteristic of the educational setting.226
Students, therefore, have the right to discuss and express their sexual-
ity,227 as long as such speech does not interfere substantially and mate-
224. See infra Part III.B regarding “No Promo Homo” laws and policies.
225. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 44.
226. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 509 (1969) (stat-
ing that First Amendment rights are limited in school if “engaging in the forbidden con-
duct would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school[ ]’”).
227. Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1076 (D. Nev. 2001).
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rially with schoolwork, discipline, and the rights of other students.228
As demonstrated by Nabozny and additional cases discussed below,
courts have held school districts and school personnel accountable for
preventing students from coming out, as well as for failing to protect
students from harassment and discrimination after they express their
sexuality.229
The Supreme Court established school children’s free expression
rights in Tinker v. Des Moines.230 In that case, several high school and
junior high school students were suspended for wearing black arm-
bands in protest of the Vietnam War.231 The students brought a First
Amendment claim against the school’s disciplinary action. The Court
found that as long as the expression at question is appropriate in a
school environment, neither students nor teachers surrender their
free expression rights “at the schoolhouse gate.”232 Indeed, students’
freedom of expression extends beyond the classroom and is to be up-
held at all school activities, as the school environment is to be viewed
in its broader meaning.233 Therefore, restrictions on students’ speech,
then, can only be limited when there is a substantial disruption to
school function, and cannot be motivated by disagreement or discom-
fort with the views expressed by the student(s) or the unpopularity of
such views.234 The Court based its strong protection for students’ free
expression in the notion that the classroom was the quintessential free
market of ideas, where students should be allowed to engage, test, or
reject different opinions, as long as they do so in a manner that is
consistent with a school’s educational purpose and does not under-
mine school functions.235 Put differently, the Court aspired for plural-
ism in diverse educational settings. This pluralism in turn facilitated
protection of children’s rights to explore and express their identities,
views and values free of the school’s assimilation demands.236
228. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. Interference does not mean a school is not obligated to
take reasonable measures to protect and foster free speech and to prevent violence by
attempting to create such interference. See Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F.Supp. 381, 388–89 (D.R.I.
1980).
229. Henkle, 150 F.Supp.2d 1067; Nabozny, 92 F.3d 446.
230. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
231. Id. at 504.
232. Id. at 506 (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
233. Id. at 512–13.
234. Id. at 509.
235. Id. at 512.
236. See Lau, supra note 12.
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Tinker established students’ rights to quietly and passively display
political symbols. The right to free expression under Tinker includes
students’ rights to reveal their sexual orientation or express support
for LGBT students at school, by displaying LGBT supportive symbols,
such as a rainbow or pink triangle, on their clothes or other personal
belongings.237
Protections for passive expression have been extended to expres-
sive conduct in the case of Fricke v. Lynch.238 Aaron Fricke was a high
school student who requested the school’s permission to attend the
prom with a same-sex date. Only students who had dates were allowed
to participate in the event. In a conversation with the principal, Mr.
Lynch, the two discussed the possibility that Fricke was bisexual or
that he would date girls, but he expressed a “commitment to homo-
sexuality.”239 The principal then refused to allow Fricke to be accom-
panied by a same-sex date to the prom. The principal cited two
reasons for his decision: first, an increased threat of violence directed
at the two boys, and possibly other attendants, and second, that al-
lowing same-sex dates at school events would send a message that the
school condones homosexuality.240 Fricke brought a First Amend-
ment claim that the school’s decision violated his rights to free associ-
ation and free expression. He argued that bringing a same-sex date to
school activities has an expressive and educational function, as their
237. Others, including teachers and administrators, are prevented from discouraging
or forbidding any behavior that limits students’ right to be out. As we’ve seen in the previ-
ous section, discrimination or harassment cannot be justified or blamed on the students
themselves because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity or
because they have chosen to reveal their sexual orientation or gender identity to others
(i.e. “come out”). Discrimination or other forms of mistreatment should not be expected
or accepted simply because of a student’s sexual orientation or gender identity. Further-
more, since free expression is not limited to the classroom, free expression cannot result in
limited participation in school activities, such as the prom even when active speech or
expressive conduct is involved. Nonetheless, since schools are to foster tolerance and diver-
sity among all students, other students may express their disapproval of same-sex sexual
orientation or gender non-conformity. They too are allowed to display messages such as
“straight pride” on their clothing, for example. So there are ways students may acceptably
express their views that homosexuality is immoral, but there are also limits, including hate
speech, inciting violence, and behavior that impinges on another student’s ability to re-
ceive an education or if the speech disturbs the educational environment. See Chambers v.
Babbitt, 145 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Minn. 2001). Other t-shirts, the messages on which were
found by the court to be “verbal assaults,” and therefore unacceptable and unprotected
under the First Amendment, read “I will not accept what God has condemned” and “ho-
mosexuality is shameful.” See discussion of Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d
1166 (9th Cir. 2006), in Lau, supra note 12, at 365–66.
238. Fricke, 491 F.Supp. 381.
239. Id. at 383.
240. Id. at 383–84 n.2.
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attendance carries the political message of equality and human rights
for sexual minorities.241 The court relied on Tinker to find that attend-
ing a function with a same-sex date is political speech that is pro-
tected, and rejected the possibility that safety concerns can constitute
a substantial interference with school function under Tinker.242 Al-
lowing objections from the audience to excuse limits on speech would
be tantamount to a “heckler’s veto,” which is inconsistent with free
expression protections. The school, therefore, could not suppress
speech because of concerns for the reaction it may engender.243 A
substantial interference cannot be solely from the audience, but from
the speaker herself.244 The Fricke court protected the student’s identity
expression right because it was not harmful to others. Community
standards expressed by a heckler’s veto, are not such a harm under
the court’s definition because they are neither caused by the speaker
herself nor infringe on another’s identity expression. Additionally, the
court believed that the school should have explored a less restrictive
approach; allowing the boys to attend the prom while increasing se-
curity to ensure students’ safety.245 The court recognizes that to truly
protect Fricke’s free speech, it must consider practical and logistical
ways in order to ensure Fricke’s rights. It therefore looks for a com-
promise between Fricke’s rights and the school’s legitimate interest in
guaranteeing the safety of students attending the prom. Ultimately,
the court required the school to provide additional security so that
the boys could attend the prom as a same-sex couple.
Although the Fricke decision was favorable to the student and his
right to express his sexual orientation at school, it is also somewhat
concerning. The court emphasizes Fricke’s “commitment to homosex-
241. Id. at 385.
242. Id. at 387.
243. Id. at 385, 387 (“It is certainly clear that outside of the classroom the fear however
justified of a violent reaction is not sufficient reason to restrain such speech in advance,
and an actual hostile reaction is rarely an adequate basis for curtailing free speech. [E]ven
a legitimate interest in school discipline does not outweigh a student’s right to peacefully
express his views in an appropriate time, place, and manner. To rule otherwise would
completely subvert free speech in the schools by granting other students a ‘heckler’s veto,’
allowing them to decide through prohibited and violent methods what speech will be
heard. The first amendment does not tolerate mob rule by unruly school children.”).
244. Id. at 387 (“[The school has] failed to make a ‘showing’ that Aaron’s conduct
would ‘materially and substantially interfere’ with school discipline.”); see, e.g., Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (where a school prohibited a student from
delivering a speech riddled with profanity and offensive language, the Court found that
the school did not violate the student’s freedom of expression as the speech was disruptive
to school functioning).
245. Fricke, 491 F.Supp. at 385–86.
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uality” as material to its decision to allow him to bring a same-sex date
to the prom.246 The conversation between Fricke and Lynch about
bisexuality (i.e. Lynch imposing a conversion demand on Fricke) is
only troubling to the court because of the strength of Fricke’s convic-
tion regarding his sexuality. To the court, the significance of bringing
a same-sex date to the prom as expressive conduct does not lie, as
Fricke argued, in a message of equality and LGBT rights, nor in re-
jecting the school’s concern for condoning homosexuality, but rather,
it lies in the view that Fricke’s homosexuality is immutable. The
court’s reliance on immutability as a determinative factor for identity
protection highly burdens children as perceived “sexual waverers”
whose “true” sexuality is second-guessed by adults who assume they
have yet to fully form their sexual orientation or gender identity. But
what of children who are “sexual waverers”? Bisexuals are similarly
burdened and in need of the law’s protection. Caught between the
myth of bisexuality as a transient identity on the way to same-sex sex-
ual orientation and the demand that bisexuals “choose” heterosexual-
ity simply because they “can,”247 bisexuals lack the protections for
identity rights that hinge on immutability, which are not entirely
meaningful. Yoshino’s argument that protection from conversion de-
mands must be based on the legitimacy of the identity at stake and not
its immutability comes to life in Fricke,248 where reliance upon “com-
mitment to homosexuality” rather than the legitimacy of homosexual-
ity (or bisexuality) as ground for protection leaves those still
questioning and exploring their sexuality vulnerable to restrictions on
their freedom to express that still developing identity.
Assimilation demands on children in school are inconsistent with
ideals of pluralism and diversity that prepare children for life as citi-
zens in a democratic society because pluralism ensures children’s
identity exploration and expression.249 Tinker, Fricke and other cases250
all follow from courts understanding that children’s identities ought
246. Id. at 384–85 (the court describing Fricke’s testimony as to why he is interested in
bringing a same-sex date to the prom and finding it to have “significant expressive
content”).
247. Boucai, supra note 222.
248. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 47–49.
249. See Lau, supra note 12.
250. See also Doe v. Yunits, No. 00-1060-A, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 491 (Oct. 11,
2000). Finding that prohibiting a trans student from expressing her gender identity
through her clothing was tantamount to discrimination because of sex under the sex stere-
otyping theory, because by dressing as a girl the student, who was assigned a male sex at
birth, was not conforming to stereotypes about how males should dress. Thus students have
a right to dress according to their gender identity. Id.
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to be protected so that children can continue to develop a healthy
sense-of-self. However, courts cannot be relied upon as the only, or
even primary, port of call for protecting LGBT students from assimila-
tion demands. Courts cannot prevent the injuries that have already
happened to plaintiff students. Nor has the focus on litigation strate-
gies been able to fully eradicate school-based assimilation demands.
But before elaborating on this point, it is worth exploring why LGBT
youth have been more successful in courts than LGBT adults. Identify-
ing which of children’s needs have fallen on sympathetic ears and de-
signing future strategies around them or around the reasonable
differences in outcomes might advance other accomplishments, for
teens and for adults, through and outside of litigation.
III. Beyond The Schoolhouse Gate: Rationales and
Implications
Now that we have seen that LGBT students are better protected
by the legal system than their adult counterparts are in the workplace,
we must consider why this may be and whether this is sufficient in
fending off the harms assimilation demands at school cause to LGBT
students. Below I theorize that there may be two explanations for why
children are better protected, and that both can be attributed to the
overarching concern regarding children’s development. The first con-
siders that students are still forming their identity, and that the law
reflects the knowledge produced by social science that children re-
quire enhanced protections in order to ensure healthy identity devel-
opment. The second considers children as future adults and citizens
who may need adults to guard their opportunities—their open fu-
ture—while they are still in the process of determining how to live
their adult lives. Whereas the first argument centers on psychological
reasoning, the second employs social science and liberal theory to
produce a policy argument.
A. Child Development: From Dependence to Autonomy
Erikson established his child development theory around funda-
mental concepts such as basic trust, basic mistrust, autonomy, shame,
and doubt.251 These concepts are opposites of each other, one of two
possible resolutions to conflicts between the child and her environ-
ment. The way in which conflicts are resolved in each stage of devel-
opment directs the child’s development in the following stages. Trust
251. PATTERSON, supra, note 12, at 216.
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results from a combination of sensitive care for a child’s needs along
with fostering a strong sense that the child can depend on her par-
ent.252 This way, children learn the world is safe to explore and are
confident about their social interactions.253
As they grow older, children wish to be more independent. Still,
caregivers must establish limits to ensure safety. Allowing maximum
freedom within reasonable limits lets children become confident and
proud of their actions, whereas instituting overly restrictive bounda-
ries leaves children ashamed and doubtful about their competence.254
Parents must balance fostering their child’s autonomy with placing
limits regarding safety, because children are still incapable of distin-
guishing between activities that are productive and those that are dan-
gerous.255 Striking this balance is a constant task in childrearing.
Much of how the child-parent relationship is shaped and maintained
over time and its impact on the child’s wellbeing and relationships
later in life is a result of how parents succeed in striking this balance
between fostering their child’s autonomy and ensuring her physical
and emotional safety.
Parenting that balances autonomy with limits allows children to
negotiate behavior, daily tasks, and rules and to increase their respon-
sibilities and control.256 Many conflicts stem from teens’ increasing
desire for autonomy and following their personal choices and their
parents’ ongoing enforcement of rules and boundaries of right and
wrong.257 Conflicts become less frequent as children become more
independent258 and learn to achieve autonomy in ways that fulfill
both their own needs and those of others in a socially accepted man-
ner.259 When a balance (or imbalance) between autonomy and close-
ness in the parent-child relationship emerges, it becomes a prototype
252. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, supra note 68, at 249.
253. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 216.
254. Id.
255. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, supra note 68, at 252–53 (defining shame as
self-consciousness and warning about shame turning into feelings of self-rage and self-ha-
tred causing the child (and later, adult) to rid herself of that within herself which causes
such shame).
256. Id. at 441.
257. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 548–49.
258. Id.
259. Joseph P. Allen, J. Lawrence Aber, & Bonnie J. Leadbeater, Adolescent Problem Be-
havior: The Influence of Attachment and Autonomy, 13 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 455, 460
(1990); Joseph P. Allen, Maryfrances Porter, & Christy McFarland, & Kathleen Boykin Mc-
Elhaney, The Relation of Attachment Security to Adolescents’ Parental and Peer Relationships, De-
pression, and Externalizing Behavior, 78 CHILD DEV. 1222, 1222 (2007).
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for future relationships and the balance between autonomy and close-
ness in those future relationships.260
Courts have granted children heightened protections, where sim-
ilar claims from adults have failed, in order to adjust to the particular
needs of children who are still developing their identity and therefore
tend to be more and uniquely vulnerable to assimilation demands. We
see this, for instance, in the Nabozny court’s willingness to protect
same-sex sexual orientation as “sex” or prohibiting same-sex sexual
harassment. Both these moves demonstrate perhaps how courts un-
derstand there is something different about children and teens—that,
as Erikson’s theory suggests, their identities need the safe space to
form through experiment, role modeling, expression, and other
methods, and that adolescents still require the protection of adults in
order to achieve healthy identity development.
The understanding of youth as an ongoing developmental pro-
cess in terms of emotional and mental capacities was also integrated
into the law, in a non LGBT-related context. In Roper v. Simmons,261
the Supreme Court eliminated the death penalty for offenders under
eighteen years of age for similar reasons. The opinion there is perhaps
the go-to example of how the law acknowledges the differences in psy-
chological development between minors and adults and relies on
these differences to justify greater legal protections for minors. In ad-
dition to pointing out that children’s identity is more fluid and flexi-
ble and not yet fully formed (and in doing so, relying on Erikson’s
work),262 the Court details two more rationales to treat children dif-
ferently than adults: first, teens’ lower ability to foresee or care about
consequences263 make them less mature and more reckless than
adults, and second, teens are more vulnerable to negative influences
and external pressures, including peer pressure, and have a decreased
measure of control over their environments.264 Applied to other con-
texts such as schools, it may flow from the idea of children’s vulnera-
bility that children and teens are less able to negotiate their worlds and
navigate the assimilation demands they face in order to emerge from them un-
scathed. As a result, even more resilient children, still require the assis-
tance of adults and institutions such as schools and courts to protect
260. Robert J. Waldinger et al., Attachment and Core Relationship Themes: Wishes for Auton-
omy and Closeness in the Narratives of Securely and Insecurely Attached Adults, 13 PSYCHOTHERAPY
RES. 77, 81 (2003).
261. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
262. Id. at 570.
263. Id. at 569.
264. Id. at 569.
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them from assimilation demands compromising their identity devel-
opment and emotional strength.
Vulnerability to assimilation demands does not only lead to the
general (though necessary) protections such as Nabozny’s inclusion of
sexual orientation and same-sex harassment under the umbrella
prohibitions on sex discrimination, but may have also motivated the
removal of the Price Waterhouse double-bind requirement for a prevail-
ing sex stereotypes argument. Recall that the Theno court ruled the
student experienced sexual harassment because he did not conform
to male stereotypes, a reverse-covering demand (assuming Theno was
not gay, this remains unclear) without any additional assimilation de-
mand. This is unlike Ann Hopkins who prevailed because she suffered
both a covering demand—perform like men in your professional
achievements—and a reverse-covering demand—present yourself in a
feminine and appealing manner, as is associated with and expected
from women.265 This also reflects the court’s understanding that at
this stage of development, when it is so difficult to weather assimila-
tion demands at all, it might be too burdensome and harmful for
teens to be expected to have experienced the set of assimilation de-
mands that create the double binds that merit protection in the case
of adults. One type of assimilation demand might be injurious enough
without a young person having to navigate the inconsistencies of
more.
As an ongoing process, identity development creates tensions be-
tween dependence on the protection of adults and vulnerability to
assimilation on one hand, and control and autonomy over one’s envi-
ronment and identity formation or expression on the other. These
tensions are highlighted when Fricke and Nguon v. Wolf266 are analyzed
together to explore privacy and the coming out process as more grad-
ual and sensitive for children than for adults.
Charlene Nguon was suspended from her high school for engag-
ing in inappropriate public displays of affection (PDAs) with another
female student.267 When notifying Charlene’s mother about the disci-
plinary measures against her daughter, the principal told the mother
that Charlene was kissing another girl. Charlene and her mother filed
suit against the school,268 arguing that the suspension constituted sex-
265. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
266. Nguon v. Wolf, 517 F.Supp.2d 1177 (C.D. Cali. 2007).
267. Id. at 1179–80.
268. One could infer from the fact that Charlene Nguon’s mother was a party to the
suit that the disclosure of Charlene’s sexual orientation to her mother was not detrimental
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ual orientation discrimination and that the principal’s detailing of
Charlene’s same-sex conduct amounted to a disclosure of her sexual
orientation to her mother and therefore violated Charlene’s privacy
rights.269 The court analyzed the behavior of the two girls in light of
the school’s policy regarding public displays of affection and con-
cluded that the girls’ conduct was sufficiently inappropriate and ex-
treme to justify disciplinary measures.270 Additionally, the court found
that students engaged in similar different-sex PDAs were and would be
equally disciplined for their comparable behavior.271
Recognizing that Charlene had a right to keep her sexual orienta-
tion private from her parents, the court exhibits an understanding of
the complexities of coming out during adolescence, but by placing
significant discretion with the disclosing party the court missed the
opportunity to fully ensure that the child’s privacy is safe from unwar-
ranted invasion by adults. The court began its privacy analysis by de-
fining the scope of Charlene’s privacy expectations and found that
because the PDAs were limited to school grounds, and because her
parents were not involved in Charlene’s school life, Charlene could
reasonably expect that her parents would not be aware of occurrences
at school.272 For her, home and school were separate environments.
Therefore, although the PDAs negated Charlene’s reasonable expec-
to their relationship, and thus caused no harm to Charlene. However, Charlene’s mother’s
participation as a plaintiff was a procedural requirement under California law because of
Charlene’s status as a minor. Email from Christine Sun, plaintiff’s representing attorney, to
author (Nov. 17, 2011, 5:32 PST) (on file with author). But even if Charlene’s mother was
not named as a plaintiff strictly for procedural reasons, the point of privacy rights is to
protect the information itself, not only the result of disclosure. Thus privacy rights for
children protect them from the potential for parental mistreatment, not only the mistreat-
ment itself. To make privacy rights contingent upon the harmful result of disclosure would
empty these rights because the protection will be only post-fact when harm has already
occurred, rather than preemptive of an undesirable disclosure. Id.
269. Nguon, 517 F.Supp.2d at 1179, 1192. The principal argued that disclosing the sex
of Charlene’s partner was not a disclosure of Charlene’s sexual orientation. The court
rejected that defense:
by telling [Charlene’s mother] that Charlene had been kissing another girl, [the
principal] conveyed Charlene’s sexual orientation to her mother. His statement
was unvarnished, and it was far more likely that [the mother] would infer that
Charlene was gay rather than merely acting out or mimicking a rockstar. That is
the inference which [the mother] drew from the conversation.
Id. at 1192.
270. Id. at 1186–87.
271. Id. at 1184–87.
272. Id. at 1191.
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tation of privacy regarding her sexual orientation at school, her ex-
pectation of privacy regarding her home remained intact.273
In separating the spaces of privacy, the court recognizes that the
coming out process, particularly for youth, can be gradual with one
choosing to pass as straight in certain environments while being out as
LGBT in others.274 This is particularly true for many teens that come
out in social circles or at school before they come out to their parents.
Teens come out to parents later than to peers partly because the de-
pendence of children upon their parents and their enhanced vulnera-
bility at the intersection of age and sexual orientation render that
disclosure highly threatening to adolescents.275 Moreover, separating
the spaces of privacy and recognizing that openness about sexual ori-
entation in one spatial or social context does not negate privacy ex-
pectations regarding another is a departure from how sexual
orientation privacy is applied to adults. When a news story about the
man who had prevented the assassination of President Ford included
details of his sexual orientation, it became the subject of a privacy
suit.276 The court ruled that since the plaintiff was a known activist in
the gay rights movement, his sexual orientation was already public
knowledge and that he could no longer have an expectation that such
information would be kept private.277
At first blush, Charlene Nguon’s case seems inapposite to that of
Fricke, the boy who sought permission to bring a same-sex date to his
school prom. Charlene wanted to keep her sexual orientation under
wraps, whereas Fricke fought for the right to make it exceptionally
public. But digging deeper, we can see how in effect both students
wished to take control of the disclosure and expressions of their iden-
tities, and both wished to do so free and protected from assimilation
demands. Colored in this light, the opinions in both cases teach us
273. Id. at 1191 (“Charlene ha[s] a constitutionally protected privacy right with respect
to disclosure of her sexual orientation. . . . At school [the girls] were open in their expres-
sions of affection for one another. . . . Charlene had no reasonable expectation that her
sexual orientation would not be disclosed in the context of her school. Her conduct at
school was inconsistent with any right to keep her sexual orientation private. . . . It does not
follow that disclosure in one context necessarily relinquishes the privacy right in all con-
texts. . . . Charlene’s home was an insular environment, and . . . her activities . . . at school
were unlikely to be known to her parents unless they were expressly informed. Thus, . . .
Charlene had a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning her sexual orientation at
home.”).
274. YOSHINO, supra note 13, at 64–65.
275. Lau, supra note 12, at 370–71.
276. Sipple v. Chronicle Pub’g Co., 154 Cal.App.3d 1040 (1984).
277. Id. at 1047 (“[T]here can be no privacy with respect to a matter which is already
public or which has previously become part of the ‘public domain.’”).
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how important it is for young people to have autonomy over their
coming out process and to control—without fear of harm from
others—whether, when, how, and to whom they come out. These
cases remind us that indeed, coming out is a process, which is closely
interwoven with the broader process of identity development.
This process, like discrimination or harassment generally, and the
tensions between heightened vulnerability and growing autonomy,
have—and should—warrant greater protections for students exper-
iencing assimilation demands because this heightened protection pre-
serves children’s ability to continue on the developmental task of
identity achievement. In this sense, the case law has developed, based
on the law that applies to adults, to meet children’s unique psycholog-
ical needs.
By “greater protection,” I mean both greater than current protec-
tions to students, and greater than the protections available to adults.
Charlene Nguon’s case also demonstrates how courts could be more
vigilant in protecting children. The court rejected her discrimination
claim because it found that her sexual orientation—or the sex of her
partner—were irrelevant to the decision to suspend her. Yet it also
found that the school was within its authority to notify her mother of
her partner’s sex so that Charlene Ngoun and her parents could
mount a defense. This is internally inconsistent—if the sex of her
partner was indeed irrelevant, how would it have been helpful in ob-
jecting to the suspension? In this regard, the court could have been
more forceful in insisting that disclosure by the school must be ex-
ceedingly limited. Perhaps a rebuttable presumption is in place. This
is not like the current structure of such claims where a student must
first demonstrate that her rights have been infringed and then the
burden shifts to the school that the infringement had an educational
purpose—similarly to how discrimination claims for adults require
first a showing of discrimination and then a failure of the employer to
demonstrate a BFOQ. The idea of a rebuttable presumption would
increase students’ protection both compared to where they are now
and compared to adults. However, the details of this are beyond the
scope of this paper.
B. Policy Considerations: Open Future
In addition to allowing children to reach identity achievement
and to protect them from the emotional wounds of assimilation de-
mands, I would suggest that courts in the cases discussed above were
motivated by a related concern for the foreclosure of children’s iden-
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tity interests in the legal and social policy sense as well. Most rules
established in those cases can be seen as protecting the foundations of
LGBT identities and validating them as acceptable so that children
grow up able to pursue and express their identities safely and fully the
closer they come to adulthood. Those rules also demonstrate that
their wellbeing and autonomy is protected in order for them to grow
up to be productive and informed members of society.
In contrast to other scholars who advocate children’s autonomy
rights but struggle with the issue of a child’s actual capacity to make
autonomous decisions, Joel Feinberg would have these rights pro-
tected as anticipatory rights for children.278 Feinberg categorizes chil-
dren’s rights as belonging to one of two groups. Dependency rights
are rights that are based in children’s dependence on adults for their
basic needs and survival.279 Rights-in-trust are those rights that adults
hold but whose exercise is contingent upon a child’s capacity and de-
velopment. Rights-in-trust should be “saved” for children until they
are able to enjoy them. Violation of rights-in-trust is conduct that de-
nies the child of future options.280 Therefore, conceptually, children’s
self-determination and autonomous decision-making rights are not
their own, but rather they are the adult’s that the child is to be-
come.281 These rights are protected in advance so that the potential
adult will later be able to make meaningful decisions.
Feinberg uses the example of education of Amish children in
cases such as Wisconsin v. Yoder282 to further explain the concept of
children’s open future. For Feinberg, these were not cases about par-
ents’ rights, but about children’s rights, which the state as parens pa-
triae must protect.283 However, the Amish children were disserted by
courts that allowed parents to pull them out of school early. This costs
them the opportunity to benefit from a well-rounded education. The
Amish children were limited to an education that prepared them only
for one way of life. Their upbringing, as condoned by courts, irreversi-
bly revoked any real possibility for these children to later opt for any-
278. Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?: CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125 (William Aken & Hugh LaFol-
lette eds., 1980).
279. Id. at 125.
280. Id. at 125–26 (“[The child’s] right while he is still a child is to have these future
options kept open until he is a fully formed self- determining adult capable of deciding
among them.”).
281. Id. at 127.
282. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
283. Feinberg, supra note 279, at 132.
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thing other than life as part of the Amish community. Feinberg argues
that in such conflicts, options that keep as many possible choices avail-
able to the child for when she is able to make her own decisions, and
therefore privilege her open future, are to prevail.284 Accordingly,
childrearing and education should be motivated by the maximization
of children’s opportunities for self-fulfillment.285 The goal is to keep
as many open possibilities as would best equip the child with knowl-
edge and skills to enable her to determine which way of life best fits
her sense-of-self.286 A child is denied an open future when her auton-
omy is violated in advance in ways that vital and determinative deci-
sions are made by others before she herself has the capacity to make
such decisions.287
The same policy of preserving the child’s open future can be
found in cases regarding LGBT students. While educators, fellow stu-
dents and parents may try to steer LGBT students into heteronorma-
tivity, courts have refused to accept that avoiding homosexuality is a
legitimate public interest. As a matter of law, then, heteronormativity
is not an assimilation demand that the government may validly pur-
sue. Recall, that in Nabozny the court rejected the school’s arguments
that, relying on Bowers and the criminalization of sodomy, there was a
rational basis for the school’s discrimination of Nabozny and its fail-
ure to protect him from harassment.288 In doing so, the court can be
understood to reject the idea that the state has the power to impose
conversion demands on LGBT children, whether it be through
school-based discrimination, harassment, or through the criminaliza-
tion of sodomy.289 Similarly, the Theno court would not accept that the
school there was within its rights not to protect him from the harass-
ment he suffered for being a “girly-girl,” for example.290 In other
words, the court there also rejected the idea that it would be permissi-
284. Id. at 13–33.
285. Feinberg defines self-fulfillment as “the development of one’s chief aptitudes into
genuine talents in a life that gives them scope, an unfolding of all basic tendencies and
inclinations.” Id. at 143. Autonomy, according to Feinberg, is the right of self-determina-
tion and is instrumental for self-fulfillment. Id.
286. See id. at 135.
287. Id. at 143.
288. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 458.
289. It is possible, however, that the court’s rejection of criminalization of sodomy as a
rational basis regarding the mistreatment of students is the assumption that, perhaps, be-
cause of age of consent and statutory rape laws, the court wished to avoid the considering
the relationship between sodomy and adolescence. Perhaps the court was willing to de-link
sodomy laws as a rational basis by assuming that LGBT students would not, due to their
age, be engaging in sodomy.
290. Theno, 394 F.Supp.2d 1306–1307.
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ble for a school and fellow students to violently impose assimilation
demands in order to compel a student to conform to stereotypically
gendered behavior or a heteronormative identity and expression.
These two cases demonstrate how courts that penalize schools for im-
posing assimilation demands (or being silent when fellow students
do) protect LGBT students from having to abandon the path toward
developing their authentic self for fear for their safety. By doing so,
courts preserve LGBT students’ ability to continue to explore their
identities and preserve their future rights vis-a`-vis those identities.
There are, however, examples of cases where courts, even want-
ing to protect children from assimilation demands, go about it in ways
that restrict children’s rights-in-trust and limit their open future.
Fricke, insofar that the court relied on Fricke’s “commitment to homo-
sexuality,” can be seen as an example. One of the factors that seemed
material for the court’s decision to protect Fricke’s right to bring a
same-sex date to the school prom was the conversation he had with
Mr. Lynch about the possibility of dating girls.291 Fricke insisted that
he was interested in boys, perhaps indicating he had reached identity
achievement in his sexual orientation. The court can be understood
as respecting this. However, the fact that this was even an issue that
came up is troubling. Straight children are not similarly expected to
consider dating partners of the same-sex before being allowed to
bring their date of choice to a school function (though perhaps Erik-
son, who supported identity exploration and experimentation, would
today approve of such expectations). And courts would presumably
not base their holdings regarding the rights of straight students on
them meeting a burden of demonstrating exploration and then con-
viction as to their sexual orientation. But the reason this is most con-
cerning is that the demand to demonstrate “conviction,” which is not
expected of his straight counterparts, may have led Fricke into iden-
tity foreclosure—denying him the opportunities of true explorations.
Put differently, Mr. Lynch and the court, together and separately, may
have pushed Fricke to make a decision about his sexual orientation
earlier than he otherwise would have, thus making him commit to an
identity too early and without meaningful opportunity to preserve his
future rights, for instance, taking a girl to the prom the following year
as expressive conduct of a potentially fluid identity, experimentation,
or once more as part of the process toward identity achievement.
291. See supra Part II.B.
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In addition to the traditional discrimination, harassment, and
free speech cases discussed above, perhaps another compelling exam-
ple for the theory that a concern for children’s open future has moti-
vated courts to protect LGBT students from assimilation demands
more strongly than they do adults, is discrimination in school curric-
ula—also referred to as “No Promo Homo”292 statutes and policies.
These are education policies discouraging the “promotion” of homo-
sexuality in schools that have been adopted in several states by statute
and/or at the school board level.293 Some such policies avoid any
mention of homosexuality within the curriculum, as a purported
means to achieve neutrality on the matter. However, commentators
have asserted that the invisibility of sexuality, particularly homosexual-
ity, denies its place in school culture—leaving LGBT teens vulnerable
and isolated.294 A more severe approach is acknowledging homosexu-
ality solely through its denunciation and providing no other acknowl-
edgement of sexual diversity. These policies aim to teach children
heteronormativity and the superiority of heterosexuality in an attempt
to construct their sexuality in ways society considers productive and
desirable. Thus, they reflect an assumption that children are not yet
fixed in their sexuality and that adults around them are responsible
for preventing their conversion to an inferior and undesirable same-
sex sexual orientation.
“No Promo Homo” policies, prevalent in a significant number of
states,295 prohibit any exposure, and often explicitly prohibit any posi-
tive exposure, of students to sexual orientation or gender identity mat-
ters. They may also be used to oppose LGBT-positive student groups,
such as Gay-Straight Alliances, from operating at school, despite the
fact that under certain circumstances federal law protects these
groups’ activities.296
292. Eskridge, supra note 98.
293. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 16, at 1010.
294. Id. at 1011.
295. According to GLSEN, these states currently include Alabama, Arizona, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah. No Promo Homo, GLSEN (Oct. 19,
2016, 1:15pm), http://www.glsen.org/learn/policy/issues/nopromohomo [https://per
ma.cc/BS3X-YV53].
296. The Equal Access Act of 1984 provides that federally funded public schools that
allow non-curricular student groups access to school facilities and services, may not dis-
criminate between those groups, and may not discriminate based on sexual orientation or
gender identity. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2011). Therefore, as long as a school has groups meet-
ing on school grounds that are allowed to use school services such as bulletin boards or
public address systems it must allow all groups the same access regardless of the content or
subject-matter of the group. A non-curricular student group is a group whose subject-mat-
ter does not directly relate to classes offered by the school, where participation is neither
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These policies and other educational strategies designed to
marginalize LGBT people (such as abstinence only sexual education,
which teaches abstinence or marital sex as the only means to avoid
unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections) result in
the exacerbated isolation and exclusion of LGBT youth from school
life through invisibility, lack of resources and support systems within
the school,297 and the subtle dissemination of homophobia and
transphobia through ignorance, silence, and de-legitimization. An-
other troubling consequence is that LGBT children do not receive a
beneficial education that will prepare them for the life they are likely
to lead, a right that courts have continually protected. In the case of
LGBT children, who do not ordinarily share the sexual aspects of
their identities with parents or other family members, an education
that is value neutral (or preferably positive) toward sexual diversity is
all the more necessary. School curriculum that is silent or negative on
sexual diversity does not engage children in education that is respect-
ful to sexual minorities. This assimilation indoctrinates children to
idealize an exclusionary and restrictive construct of sexuality that re-
volves around marital heteronormative sexuality. Substitution of pa-
rental control over school’s educational authority impacts a larger
number of children’s sexual identities and sexual health, and is rea-
son for concern over public health as well.
“No Promo Homo” policies were tested in court, for example, in
Parker v. Hurley,298 where parents sought to essentially force a school
required for classes nor results in academic credit. See Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty.
Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 241–42 (1990); Boyd Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ.,
258 F.Supp.2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
297. Examples of such resources and support systems can be identifying a school
staffer who is supportive to LGBT students, or creating “safe zones”—designated times and
places at school where a student is welcome to approach teachers and discuss personal or
other concerns in private. Having teachers and administrators out or supportive increases
students’ sense of safety and belonging at school, lowers numbers of missed schooldays and
leads to higher rates of students planning to go to college. As sexual orientation and gen-
der identity are a sensitive issue for most LGBT students, particularly when they are still
associated with concerns of exclusion, discrimination and harassment, many will avoid
turning to others to discuss what they may be going through. Resources that will allow
students to intellectually explore sexual orientation or gender identity issues can comple-
ment other support systems to which students may hesitate to reach out. Resources such as
books, videos or computers should be available for exploratory research. Also, resources
should be accessible in a manner that is private and discrete.
298. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008). For similar parental challenges to
curriculum that discuss LGBT content, see Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir.
2005) (parental positive rights to excuse children from classes their parents find objection-
able would make administering public education impossible); Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer
Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) (ruling that granting parents rights to direct
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to adopt such polices. The parents there attempted to persuade the
court to exempt their children from programs they feared would ex-
pose the children to homosexuality that may encourage them to de-
velop non-heteronormative identities.299 The parents requested to
excuse their children from certain school classes (“opt out”) that dis-
cuss homosexuality and same-sex marriage as part of the school’s non-
discrimination and diversity education based on their free exercise
and parental rights.300 Because these classes were limited to diversity
education,301 the court found these classes to be squarely within the
policy to promote engagement pluralism in schools. The court re-
jected the parents’ opt out demands as it saw the references to homo-
sexuality, which focused on tolerance and did not engage discussions
on physical or sexual implications of homosexuality, as outside the
scope of sexual education.302 Moreover, the curriculum had no coer-
cive component. While the First Amendment protects an individual
from coercion to adopt or disavow beliefs forbidden or required by
one’s religion,303 the school did not require any such action. The stu-
dents, found the court, were not compelled to embrace the views
presented in the diversity classes or reject their religion in any way.304
public education would be unworkable and create impossible burdens on schools to design
specific curriculums for many students); Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County, 419
F.Supp.2d 937 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (rejecting parents’ request to excuse children from diversity
training because it did not include an anti-LGBT perspective, finding that such instruction
did not constitute one-sided indoctrination).
299. Parker, 514 F.3d at 90. These classes, for example, included readings about fami-
lies with same-sex parents.
300. Id. The parents sought to opt their children out of these classes until the children
reached, at the very least, the seventh grade.
301. Sexual education is generally understood to include lessons on human sexual
health issues such as reproduction, sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and the preven-
tion thereof. Instruction of materials that discuss gender, sexuality or families without dis-
cussing reproductive organs and their functions generally does not constitute sexual
education. Rachmilovitz, Assimilation Demands, supra note 12, at 188–89.
302. Parker, 514 F.3d at 92. For a discussion of the statutory sources of opt out rights,
and the different forms they may take across states, see Kevin Rogers & Richard Fossey,
Same-Sex Marriage and the Public School Curriculum: Can Parents Opt Their Children Out of Cur-
ricular Discussions about Sexual Orientation and Same-Sex Marriage?, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
423, 438–60 (2011) (“[A]lthough federal courts do not allow curriculum opt-outs on con-
stitutional grounds, most states have statutes or administrative regulations that grant curric-
ular exemptions in varying situations for public schools. . . . [S]tatutes or administrative
regulations in all fifty states and the District of Columbia [ ]grant parents a specific right to
excuse their children from some part of the public school curriculum. These statutes and
regulations were then categorized into three groups: states with opt-out laws that are ‘re-
strictive,’ states with opt-out laws that are ‘permissive,’ and states that are categorized as
‘non-existent’ (meaning that these states have no curriculum opt-out law.”).
303. Parker, 514 F.3d at 104–05.
304. Id. at 105–06.
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They were not even required to actively participate in the discussion
of tolerance for homosexuality.305 Therefore, because the school’s ac-
tion was not, strictly speaking, an assimilation demand, the court found
it to be permissible.
The court relied on Massachusetts policy to facilitate engagement
pluralism in schools by teaching respect and diversity in order to elim-
inate sex and race stereotypes and found that goal to also eliminate
stereotypes about homosexuality.306 Because of the legislatures’ and
courts’ policy to ensure engagement pluralism, free exercise rights do
not create freedom from any reference to non-traditional families or
to same-sex relationships.307
In addition to reinforcing pluralism as preparing children for
adult civic life and reiterating exposure and non-coercion as the mark-
ers of engagement, the Parker opinion can be seen as incorporating an
“open future” concept as a limiting principle to parental rights, and in
turn school powers. The Parker court does what the Yoder court failed
to do. In Parker, the court saw that an education that would best pre-
pare children to become adults in mainstream American society re-
quires knowledge and intellectual tools additional to those their
parents might provide.308 In Parker, the differences in views to which
children are exposed are meant to supplement each other; neither
parents nor schools are restricted from exposing children to values
they see appropriate to teach. The decision sees the benefit of expos-
ing children to both worlds, rather than closing off any potential val-
ues sets. The court in Parker truly facilitates an open future for
children who are engaged in several different perspectives and are
trusted to test these perspectives before adopting or rejecting them.
By allowing the children to have an open future, maintaining a full
range of opportunities to explore the values and principles that will
come to construct their identity—religious, sexual, or otherwise—the
court also fostered the children’s opportunity to reach a well-formed
identity in the manner that Erikson believed necessary for emotional
health and well-being. It also keeps students’ potential political in-
volvement, their rights, and their decision-making open to critical
thinking and fuller participation in the democratic process while be-
305. Id. at 106.
306. Id. at 91.
307. Id. at 106. Further, free exercise does not grant parents the power to control the
substance of school curriculum, as the First Amendment does not include positive rights.
Id. at 102–103.
308. Id.; see also Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987); see
generally Davis v. Page, 385 F.Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974).
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ing more informed, having a healthier sense of self, and less influ-
enced by messaging that devalues diverse identities and groups,
whether they identify with those or not.
This is not only better for their emotional adjustment or function
as contributing, thoughtful adults in a democracy, but also a funda-
mental right. After Lawrence,309 Romer,310 and Obergefell,311 in which the
Supreme Court held that the state could not constitutionally bar
same-sex sexual conduct, could not target lesbian, gay, or bisexual
people for discrimination based on animus, or prohibit marriage
equality, respectively, an LGBT identity can no longer be sanctioned
by the state as less desirable. The state, including schools as state-ac-
tors, must at least remain neutral312 on the value of sexual minority
identity thus eliminating assimilation demands in state controlled en-
vironments as they can no longer be justified in putting forth a heter-
onormative social, political and legal landscape.
C. LGBT Youth Vulnerability: Plethora of Risks; Dearth of
Responses
The argument made in this article, that courts tend to protect
LGBT children from school-based assimilation demands better than
LGBT adults in the workplace must not lead us to misguided notions
that LGBT youth are safe in schools or that the law no longer need be
concerned with their wellbeing. It is undoubtedly positive—indeed
necessary—that courts are stepping up and protecting LGBT students,
but relying solely on courts to ensure their equitable education, physi-
cal safety, and emotional health is insufficient.
As the social science data presented throughout demonstrate,
LGBT youth who suffer assimilation demands remain overrepresented
among at-risk youth313 but are under-protected by the legal system as a
whole, possibly in part because of the focus on protecting children
309. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
310. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
311. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
312. Perhaps, as analogous to religion, the State should not be directing or expressing
a preference in regard to sexual identities. However, an opposite view is possible whereby
in light of past practices, like sodomy laws or marriage inequality, and ongoing ones like
“No Promo Homo” laws and the failure to enact the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
to cover sexual orientation and gender identity, the state has already inflicted significant
damage and must now correct the strong heteronormative messaging it puts forth. This
debate, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
313. Russell et al., Out at School, supra note 81; Toomey et al., supra note 83; Russell et
al., School Victimization, supra note 86; Himmelstein & Bruckner, supra note 91; Ray, supra
note 91; SURVEY 2009, supra note 102; SURVEY 2013, supra note 102.
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through litigation rather than effective prevention. Consider, for ex-
ample, the recent legislation prohibiting the explicit protection of
LGBT students in anti-bullying legislation.314 These are statutes that
specifically and explicitly decline to protect a segment of the student
population that data and case law have identified as particularly vul-
nerable to bullying. Instead, they lump them together with other bul-
lied students as if there is nothing uniquely troubling about
assimilation demands that target a student for her sexual minority
identity, thus devaluing and mistreating a student for who she is. Per-
haps courts are prepared to protect students better than they do
adults because they see themselves as the only real line of defense.
The ongoing prevalence of school harassment and discrimination,
perhaps, indicates that students’ only meaningful recourse is through
the courts. Yet, students have already suffered emotional distress and
educational harms by the time they prevail in court. In fact, they must
be able to demonstrate that they already suffered harm in order to
prevail in their claims,315 which shows that the litigation route might
be considered too little, too late for these specific children.
Social science research has identified a variety of increased nega-
tive outcomes and risks for LGBT youth and has tied those outcomes
to troubled relationships. Because LGBT youth are so disempowered
by assimilation demands they may be unable to access the legal sys-
tem. Children and teens who experience assimilation demands—par-
ticularly when they experience rejection from parents, too—are less
likely to have access to the financial resources often required for se-
curing legal representation or initiating court proceedings. They may
also fear that waging legal battles against schools or other students
would further victimize them by worsening their relationships with
teachers or fellow students. As the reluctance to report316 and the rea-
son for this reluctance (i.e., the doubt that effective action would be
taken, or that they would suffer retaliation317) indicate, LGBT youth
who are subjected to homophobia and mistreatment from a range of
sources might distrust the courts and doubt that judges will protect
them.
Getting past such obstacles opens the door to a whole host of
other challenges. Children and teens may not yet be resourceful
enough to identify and locate services that can help them. They may
314. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 175 and accompanying text.
315. See Orr, Harassment and Hostility, supra note 189.
316. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at 28, 34.
317. Id. at 29.
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not be aware nor have the tools to learn about advocacy organizations
able to help them. Many school libraries program computer filters to
block any website using terms such as “gay,” “lesbian,” “transgender,”
and the like as a way to prevent children’s access to pornography.318
As a result, youth are unable to use these computers, which may be
the only computers to which some students have access, or have some-
what private access to, to look online for legal assistance that fits their
needs as LGBT students. Without access to this information, it is diffi-
cult for youth to recognize that they have rights against their schools,
school staff, or fellow students, or for schools to understand and fol-
low their duties to protect students. Thus, even in states where there is
legislation in place prohibiting discrimination and harassment based
on sexual orientation and/or gender identity, schools may not under-
stand what type of behavior these statutes target and students may not
know when and how to assert their rights. Put differently, the many
obstacles standing in LGBT students’ way to empower themselves and
gain protections against their school-based assimilation demands are
compounded by barriers put up by the educational system itself. Con-
sequently, the victimization and disempowerment of LGBT children
and adolescents continue.
To best complement the work done by courts, and ultimately to
reduce reliance on litigation, greater efforts toward preventing assimi-
lation demands must be made. As argued, efforts at the school level to
implement statutory policies and case law are not enough because as-
similation demands remain prevalent and courts seem to remain the
primary effective port of call. It appears not enough is being done at
the school level to implement statutory policies and the case law.319
Changes on the ground, such as school policies and changes in curric-
ula, have been found effective in reducing the discrimination and har-
assment of LGBT students.320 Social scientists studying the adjustment
of LGBT students in later life have also suggested strategies such as
adopting and enforcing non-discrimination and harassment policies
that are understandable to students and staff and that include protec-
tions for LGBT students; developing mechanisms disseminating infor-
318. Anti-LGBT Web Filtering, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 8, 2016, 10:40 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/issues/lgbt-rights/lgbt-youth/anti-lgbt-web-filtering [https://perma
.cc/D6ST-VMRQ]. For cases on online filtering litigated by the ACLU, leading to the re-
moval of such LGBT-related page blockers, see ACLU (Feb. 8, 2016, 10:43AM) https://
www.aclu.org/search/%20?f%5B0%5D=field_issues%3A226&f%5B1%5D=type%3Acase
[https://perma.cc/S4EA-PPL2].
319. Russell et al., School Victimization, supra note 86, at 229.
320. SURVEY 2013, supra note 102, at 61, 76.
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mation about sexual minority identities and providing support for
students with related concerns; training school staff to regularly and
effectively intervene when assimilation demands take place; establish-
ing student support groups and activities, such as gay-straight alli-
ances.321 As one study concludes:
School administrators and educators must continue to advocate for
and to implement LGBT inclusive policies and programs to pro-
mote safe and supportive learning environments where all students
are protected from bias-motivated victimization and harassment
and are free to learn and flourish in schools. For too many LGBT
[. . .] students, school victimization has resulted in. . . restricted life
chances. . . and undermine their human potential.322
D. After the Schoolhouse Gate: Higher Education
Now that we know that better protections exist in education than
in employment, we might ask ourselves: Could this trend extend be-
yond K-12 education and into institutions of higher education? On
one hand, college and university students are young people who may
still be developing their identities and are still working through de-
pendence on adults toward autonomy and agency. It therefore seems
that similar rationales for protecting schoolchildren would apply to
them too, and therefore, courts might be persuaded to extend
stronger protections to them also. On the other hand, college stu-
dents are mostly legal adults who have reached the age of majority.
This means, in the eyes of the law, that their rights and obligations vis-
a`-vis that state and others are different than those of minors. Gener-
ally, their age means that the state, including courts, would be less
inclined to intervene in their lives, even if this is for their own protec-
tion. The tension between autonomy and paternalism in their rela-
tionship with the state is heightened for LGBT students in higher
education.
Still, to truly tackle the issues of LGBT youth and young adults
struggling with assimilation demands in their educational settings,
and to continue to entrench a politics of LGBT identity legitimacy,
LGBT rights advocates should not overlook this group. Protection
would remain necessary as students in higher education continue to
experience the assimilation demands that their younger counterparts
experience. In a study published in 2008, social scientists found that
as many as 58% of participating LGBT college students experienced
321. Russell et al., School Victimization, supra note 86, at 229; Russell et al., Out at School,
supra note 83, at 641.
322. Russell et al., School Victimization, supra note 86, at 229.
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some form of homophobic mistreatment on campus, and as many as
39% of their straight counterparts reported homophobic experiences
as well.323 College and university students seem similarly vulnerable to
victimization as K-12 students, but by virtue of their adulthood are at
risk of losing whatever protections they may have enjoyed before.
It seems the development of a hybrid model between employ-
ment and high schools is most likely. Title IX and the special charac-
teristics and goals of education would lead to greater protections for
college students than for employees in the workplace, but because col-
lege students are mostly adults rather than minor children, they may
be seen as less vulnerable, and so the protections they receive would
be less extensive. Arguably, as opposed to young schoolchildren, col-
lege students are adults who need to learn to cope with pressures and
even aggression from others. However, the Supreme Court has found
that young adults have certain vulnerabilities in their psychological
development, and that the age of 18 is an arbitrary line that may not
represent accurately the rate of development in all cases.324 So per-
haps the rationale of protecting identity development should extend
from high school students to college students as well.
A recent indication that this may indeed be the direction of the
case law is the motion to dismiss decision in Videckis v. Pepperdine Uni-
versity.325 There, two college students filed a Title IX suit against their
university for discrimination and harassment they experienced as
members of the school’s women’s basketball team because they were
perceived to be lesbians dating each other.326 The discrimination and
harassment was designed to get the two students to quit the team.327
323. Perry Silvershanz et al., Slurs, Snubs, and Queer Jokes: Incidence and Impact of Heter-
osexist Harassment in Academia, 58 SEX ROLES 179, 187 (2008).
324. Roper, 543 U.S. at 601–02. But consider doctrines like “mature minor” or “rule of
seven” which evaluate a child’s maturity to make medical decisions or designate criminal
responsibility according to age in seven-year intervals, respectively, as well as the case law
on abortions or emancipation. These areas of the law are all based on the assumption that
maturity and autonomy move on a spectrum, and may be understood to support moving
the age of majority, decision-making rights, and thus possibly rights, obligations or other
protections granted to younger people earlier rather than later, usually around age 14.
Rachmilovitz, Assimilation Demands, supra note 12, at 63–65 (mature minor), 65–71 (abor-
tion), 71–75 (emancipation), 337 (rule of seven).
325. Amended Order Denying Defendant Pepperdine University’s Motion to Dismiss
Third, Fourth, & Fifth Causes of Action of the Third Amended Complaint, Videckis v.
Pepperdine Univ., 100 F.Supp.3d 927 (2015) (No. 15–00298), available at https://as-
sets.documentcloud.org/documents/2648492/Pepperdine-Title-IX-Ruling.pdf. [https://
perma.cc/SNX4-AC3G].
326. Id. at 2.
327. Id.
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For example, in meetings with staff they were repeatedly asked per-
sonal questions about their sleeping arrangements and their dates.328
In a team meeting, the coach stated he was greatly concerned about
same-sex relationships as they were the reason teams lose, and that
they would therefore not be tolerated.329 He later told other team
members that the two were bad influences.330 Among other claims,
the students claimed they suffered sexual orientation discrimination
under Title IX.331 The university moved to dismiss these claims argu-
ing that sexual orientation is not protected under Title IX.332 In re-
sponse, the students argued that Title IX does protect sexual
orientation discrimination or, alternatively, the discriminatory behav-
ior constituted sex stereotype discrimination.333
The court found in favor of the students, and ruled that Title IX
does indeed protect against sexual orientation discrimination.334 The
court explained that because the distinction between “sex” in Title IX
and in Title VII and sexual orientation or sex stereotypes is unclear, at
best, these two provisions prohibit sexual orientation discrimination,
though not independently.335 The court applied this new rule, that
sex, sexual orientation, and sex stereotypes are inextricable, to the
specific case of the Pepperdine students thus: “If the women’s basket-
ball staff in this case had a negative view of lesbians based on lesbians’
perceived failure to conform to the staff’s views of acceptable female
behavior, actions taken on the basis of these negative biases would
constitute gender stereotype discrimination.”336
The court also considered how this case would fit into the formal
sex discrimination argument (had one been of the other sex, their
same behavior would not have been unacceptable). It found that had
the students been men dating women, rather than women dating wo-
men, they would not have been subjected to the treatment they suf-
fered.337 The court denied Pepperdine’s motion to dismiss in
December 2015.338
328. Id. at 3
329. Id. at 4.
330. Id. at 5.
331. Id. at 9.
332. Id. at 10.
333. Id. at 12.
334. Id. at 12, 13.
335. Id. at 12.
336. Id. at 17.
337. Id. at 18.
338. Id. at 22.
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This decision is consistent with the case law on LGBT K-12 stu-
dents in two important ways: it includes sexual orientation in the cate-
gory of “sex” as a prohibited motivation for discrimination and
harassment and it applies the sex stereotypes theory without requiring
the student to have experienced a double bind. The Videckis court
presents two rationales for finding that Title IX covers sexual orienta-
tion in the categories of impermissible discrimination and harass-
ment. First, it finds the distinction between “sex” and “sexual
orientation” incoherent, artificial, confusing, and misguided, almost
indicating that in this case, and possibly in others, one’s sexual orien-
tation is the cause of their perceived transgressions against the stereo-
types associated with their sex. In other words, one’s sexual
orientation is the very way in which one does not meet the stereotypes
of one’s sex. This reasoning leads the court to the second rationale,
which is reminiscent of Theno. It is the formal approach to sex discrim-
ination—that had the students been men dating women, rather than
women dating women—they would not have been subjected to the
mistreatment of their coaches and the team staff. Similarly, the Theno
court found Theno’s argument that had he been a girl suffering the
same harassment from male students, the school would have taken
action persuasive. By finding so, both the Theno and the Videckis courts
followed the logic that the same treatment would garner a different
response from the school had the students involved been of the differ-
ent sex.
As for the Videckis court, too, dropping the double bind require-
ment, consider that the students there were pressured to conform to
their presumably straight teammates in their dating, sleep habits, and
other personal matters. However, they were not expected to perform a
certain way on the team or in games (whether the comparator being
straight female or male basketball players). They only faced the single
pressure to conform to heteronormativity and there is no other identi-
fiable set of assimilation demands. Thus, the Videckis case is unlike
Price Waterhouse where the employee was expected to perform like a
man but look and act like a woman—i.e. expected to navigate a
double bind—and thus prevailed in court. It is, however, like the Na-
bozny decision, where the student was only expected to conform to the
stereotypes associated with teenage masculinity, but still prevailed—
without demonstrating a double bind—under the sex stereotypes
theory.
While this decision seems to bring higher education students
closer to the level of protection enjoyed by K-12 students, it is unclear
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whether this trend will stick. It is only the first decision in this context
to hold as such, and the holding of the decision may be unstable be-
cause of its procedural posture as a motion to dismiss. At the end of
the litigation, the court may expand or narrow this initial decision.
Notably, the decision states that sexual orientation can garner Title IX
protections only as a sub-set of sex discrimination. However, at this
point the court has yet to develop this qualifier with any further detail.
It remains to be seen what this means and whether it chips away at or
cements higher education students’ ability to harness Title IX protec-
tions when experiencing discrimination or harassment based on their
sexual orientation. In any event, one would hope that all the educa-
tion-based interests that motivate courts’ protection in the high school
context would persist at the university level, too. Both levels of educa-
tion hold similar educational missions—such as allowing free and safe
market of ideas or preparing students for life in a diverse and pluralis-
tic democracy. Courts would do well to be guided by these principles
when deciding higher education harassment, discrimination, or cur-
riculum cases.
Conclusion
Marriage equality was probably the greatest goal of the LGBT
movement in recent years. Now that the Supreme Court has declared
restrictions on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, the LGBT rights
movement is open to new and exciting possibilities as to the goals that
remain. This article joins the voices in the movement that have long
advocated for LGBT youth and students and that now suggest their
concerns come closer to center stage. The article also fits into the rich
body of scholarship addressing the issues of LGBT students. However,
the article is unique in that it maps where and how the struggle to
protect LGBT students has been more successful than that addressing
the needs of the LGBT adults.
These successes have so far been limited primarily to litigation,
where courts hearing cases on discrimination and harassment of
LGBT students have come to their aid. Courts have done so by remov-
ing some important obstacles to protection in these cases, such as re-
moving the requirement of a double-bind in sex stereotyping cases or
by finding that sex discrimination includes sexual orientation as well.
Two possible rationales have been presented here to explain why
courts have opted to better protect schoolchildren: first, the need to
allow children to develop healthy identities free of assimilation de-
mands and their harms, and second, the public interest in protecting
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children’s open future and anticipatory rights so that they can grow
up to become productive, contributing, and informed citizens.
Still, that the struggles of LGBT youth in educational settings per-
sist indicates that the successes of litigation have been insufficient. Im-
proving the lives of LGBT youth and ending their struggles is to be
fought on many fronts—schools, out of home care, the criminal sys-
tem, and homes—with a range of strategies in addition to litigation,
some of which have been mentioned above. Perhaps now that mar-
riage equality has been achieved, the LGBT rights movement would
be willing and able to devote more effort and resources to fight the
battle for LGBT students on multiple fronts, building on the consider-
able accomplishments made in courts and continuing to cement them
at the statutory, policy, and implementation levels, so that the right to
be free of assimilation demands becomes the lived experience of all
LGBT students.
